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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the planning process for a major expansion project in the Port of
Rotterdam, the Netherlands (Maasvlakte 2), as a case study of mutual gains-oriented
consensus building and interactive problem solving. After years of formal negotiations
between a broad range of local, regional, and national stakeholders, the project planning
came to an impasse when environmental organizations and port expansion proponents
could not reconcile their positions on if and under what conditions the port should be
extended. I posit that at this critical juncture certain environmental organizations took an
uncharacteristically proactive role in altering the relationships between stakeholders in a
way that was crucial to the ultimate achievement of a consensus among them. The case
demonstrates how actors other than those who are formally responsible for structuring
negotiations can profoundly influence them so as to promote a sense of interdependence
and shared vision among even the seemingly most oppositional factions. This conclusion
supports the assertion by network theorists that in the modern era effective planning and
policy formulation cannot be achieved solely through government decision-making.
Instead, they must rely upon more deliberative processes that incorporate a wider range
of actors. Based upon this analysis, I prescribe a model of interaction for actors in
complex, multi-stakeholder negotiations, which, while particularly relevant to
contemporary port planning projects, is broadly applicable to diverse contexts.
Thesis Supervisor: David Laws
Title: Research Scientist and Lecturer
2
3
Acknowledgements
I am extremely appreciative to my advisor, David Laws, who gave me the opportunity to
pursue this thesis. David not only made my research possible financially but he also
provided the intellectual support that was critical for me to take on what initially was a
very daunting challenge-to pursue a topic in a foreign context where I had no previous
background knowledge. The tremendously rewarding experience I had is in large part due
to David's willingness to let me into his "other world" in the Netherlands.
Jurgen van der Heijden, my unofficial advisor across the ocean, provided me with
invaluable assistance along the way. I am very grateful to him for his contacts,
translations, and general assistance with all things Dutch.
Frans Evers' initial interest in "getting a story told" on this case is what initially
convinced me to take it on. He got me on track from the start by helping me build my
own network in the Netherlands and strategize about how to approach my work. His
willingness to consult with me on the case while ultimately letting me draw my own
conclusions about my findings was an enormous help.
Thank you to the scholars and practitioners who met with me from January-March 2005
and offered such thoughtful, candid reflections on the case. Arno Steeklenburg,
especially, was a tremendous resource, meeting with me on multiple occasions and
providing supplementary documentation, contacts, and general advice that proved very
helpful.
Pat Field was generous enough to be my reader and provided extremely useful insights
from the perspective of a "real world" practitioner.
Tijs van Maasakkers is, for better or worse, inextricable from this thesis. Among the
countless things he provided to help keep me going were exceptional lodging, large
quantities of stroopwaffels, and the affirmation that I do know what I'm talking about
even if I can't pronounce it.
Finally, thanks to my parents. This achievement and my being at MIT are reflections of
all they have provided for me.
4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ...................................... ................... 2..........
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................... ................... 5.........
I. INTRODUCTION ................... 7................................................
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................... 16
A. Deliberative Democracy, Networks, and the Rise of Governance..... 16
B. Mutual-Gains Negotiation and Consensus Building ..... .. 20
i. Goals ........................................ 21
ii. Strategies .................................... ......... 22
iii. Dilemmas ........................................................... 28
III. BACKGROUND ................... ................... .............. 31
A. A Brief History of the Port of Rotterdam .................................. 31
B. Economic and Socioeconomic Context .................... 32
C. Legal Context ......... ......... ......... .......................................35
i. National Legislation .................. ............ 35
ii. European Union Directives .................. ........ 36
IV. CASE STUDY ................................................................. 38
A. Precedents to the Rotterdam Mainport Development Project...........38
B. The Actors ................................................................. 38
C. The Rotterdam Mainport Development Project .. ........ 42
D. From PMR to ONR: The Ministerial Intervention .................. 51
E. "Vision and Daring": The Initiative of Environmental NGOs..........53
5
F. "Vision and Daring" Challenged .......................................... 68
i. Issues of Legitimacy ...................................................... 68
ii. Issues of Implementation .................. ............... 71
V. CONCLUSION .............. .......... ........................................ 82
REFERENCES .................................................................. 85
6
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades most of the world's largest ports have undertaken
major landside expansions and large-scale dredging of their harbors and shipping
channels. In case after case, these projects have sparked dramatic conflict.
Representatives of national economic interests maintain that this type of development is
essential in order for ports to remain globally competitive in the modem era. At the same
time, many stakeholders have protested that the economic benefits gained by port
expansions are outweighed by the damage caused to the natural environment and the
degradation of the quality of life of local communities. Time and time again, these
conflicts have polarized pro and anti-port sentiment and triggered long and costly legal
battles that only end when one side "wins" at the expense of the other.
In this thesis I examine the planning process for a major development project
proposed for the Port of Rotterdam. The project, called Maasvlakte 2, would entail a
second large expansion of the port into the North Sea in order to accommodate projected
growth in container shipping activity and the chemical industry. A formal planning
process, called the Rotterdam Mainport Development Project (Projectorganisatie
Mainport Rotterdam, or PMR, in Dutch), was established to determine whether and how
this expansion should occur. From the outset, one group of stakeholders, led by the
Municipality of Rotterdam and the Rotterdam Port Company, perceived expansion as an
essential step for sustaining the economic viability of the port. A second group of
stakeholders, led by regional and national environmental organizations, viewed the
planning process skeptically; they did not believe the Port could guarantee the realization
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of these economic benefits without producing significant negative environmental
consequences.
I focus on discrete episode in the fifteen-year planning process for the Second
Maasvlakte that begins with a crisis point. The crisis arose when environmental
organizations and other NGOs felt that their interests were not being adequately
addressed in the formal planning process. The Government Ministry whose mandate it
was to organize the process and to see it through to an agreement responded to impasse
by restructuring the negotiations in an effort to find an approach that would be acceptable
to the NGOs and keep them in the deliberations. At this same moment, a group of key
environmental organizations also took an unconventional step to try to re-make the
relational dynamics between stakeholders. They attempted this through a number of
actions, including the initiation of separate, informal negotiations with the Port Company.
In this thesis I address two central questions. Why did the environmental organizations
choose to undertake a parallel process with their most oppositional stakeholder? What
impact did their course of action have on the negotiating environment and the way in
which a consensus was ultimately achieved between stakeholders?
I posit that the unconventional actions of the environmental NGOs were essential
in fostering an agreement that both the environmental NGOs and the Port Company could
endorse. The impasse that had been reached could not be overcome solely by the
Ministries' restructuring of the formal planning process. The informal negotiations
between the environmental groups and the Port Company, which excluded both the
Ministries and other stakeholders, allowed the environmentalists and the Port Company
to create a new ad-hoc institution that was critical to their ability to reframe the problem
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they were trying to resolve. No longer did the environmentalists and the Port Company
see themselves as opponents and proponents of the port expansion, respectively. Instead,
they saw themselves as actors who were together seeking out a mutually-beneficial
solution founded upon principles of economic growth and environmental sustainability. It
was this reframing that allowed them to come to an agreement they could both support.
This case study calls into question whether or not it should not always be the
responsibility of government to take the initiative to restructure negotiations when they
reach a point of impasse. It demonstrates that stakeholders in complex negotiations
themselves possess the capacity to fundamentally change the relational dynamics
between parties in ways that can change the way in which policy is created. This may
mean working within the existing institutional structure but can also entail the creation of
new institutions through which to deliberate. This reflection on practice supports the
theoretical argument put forth by network theorists and proponents of deliberative
democracy that we have entered an era when "old" institutional structures and norms of
behavior for actors are insufficient to address many of today's modem planning and
policy dilemmas. Because of this, in many spheres of planning and policymaking there
has been a shift from a more reactive, passive role for stakeholders to one that is more
proactive, decentralized, and deliberative. An important shift has occurred from a more
top-down, government-centered approach to one that is characterized by a more
stakeholder-controlled system of governance.
The movement of negotiations away from the formal planning process and
government and into a realm stakeholder-driven realm has a number of important
implications. First, it raises questions regarding the straightforward applicability of some
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of the widely acknowledged principles of "best practice" consensus building. The case
shows that government alone cannot always be responsible for structuring the
environment in which consensus can be achieved. Even beyond this, stakeholders cannot
always influence negotiations in order to achieve consensus within the bounds of
government-controlled processes. The case presented in this thesis shows that certain
conditions that were necessary for consensus building could be achieved in the informal,
parallel process that could not be created within the Ministries' process. Shifting the
negotiations partially outside of the formal planning process became then a necessary
precondition to the effective application of consensus building techniques.
At the same time, shifting negotiations to a forum that is more informal and
stakeholder-led poses real dilemmas regarding the legitimacy of the process and the ease
with which its outcome can be implemented. The questions regarding the legitimacy of
consensus building processes arise from other stakeholders, the government authorities
responsible for the formal process, and the constituents who the negotiating parties are
supposed to represent. From the perspective of these groups, negotiations that are more
decentralized, informal, and driven by stakeholders do not guarantee the same levels of
transparency and permeability to diverse interests as formal, government-run processes.
Likewise, the fact that such negotiations intentionally exclude certain stakeholders-in
this case many stakeholders-creates potentially fatal problems with respect to the ability
of stakeholders involved in such processes to implement their agreements.
Beyond what this case highlights with respect to the nature of consensus building
in the context of a shift toward governance, it brings to the surface fundamental questions
about the extent to which formal representation and electoral politics are appropriate
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methods for promoting democracy once this shift has been made. The network society
presents a myriad of opportunities for citizens to exert their influence on others. Actors
within networks come to think of their interests not as discrete and separate from other
actor's, but as interconnected to them. This makes it more difficult for actors to parse our
their own distinct interests and less desirable for them to promote them independently
through representation in government. The democratic ideal in the network society is,
therefore, not equal opportunity to influence government, but a greater interdependence
among actors so that the governance that comes out of it incorporates the full range of a
society's interests. Following from this, more democratic consensus building processes
may not necessarily be those that provide all stakeholders with the same chance to
participate in formal government-led negotiations, but rather those that provide them with
opportunities to leverage their position in the network to influence the policy that arises
from it.
Finally, this case begs the question of whether the shift in the policy-making
environment will be ephemeral or lasting, partial or complete, limited to certain
circumstances or broad reaching. I conclude that in the long-term this will largely be
determined by the willingness of both future stakeholders and governmental authorities
responsible for managing such processes to proactively embrace the changing context. If
they are aware of both the opportunities and the challenges of a new, more deliberative
form of planning and policy making, they will be able to learn from them. They can take
advantage of the unique features of this context, preempt its potential problems, and
reinforce and build upon new relationships and patterns of interaction.
11
This thesis first establishes a theoretical framework to be used to understand the
case, then describes the case as a multi-perspective account of practice, and finally draws
upon these findings in order to formulate broad prescriptions from it. Chapter 2 presents
the theoretical framework through a literature review that is divided into two parts; the
first part describes emergence of the network society and the rise of deliberative
democracy and the second provides a vocabulary for talking about mutual-gains oriented
negotiation and consensus building. Chapter 3 provides background that is integral to an
understanding the case study. Chapter 4 presents the case study description based on the
retrospective accounts of stakeholders and reflection on practice. The fifth and final
chapter of this thesis gleans key lessons from the case study and discusses their broader
applicability.
The research methodology employed in this case study was interpretive in nature,
relying primarily on one-on-one interviews supplemented by primary sources from the
negotiation processes and scholarly literature on the subject. Interviews were conducted
in the Netherlands from January 2005 through March 2005. The following groups of
individuals were interviewed:
1) Direct participants in the negotiations for the Second Maasvlakte;
2) Others who might consider themselves stakeholders, but were not involved
directly in negotiations;
3) Academic scholars with knowledge about the negotiations and the wider planning
context.
This thesis also relied upon a range of documentation on the Port of Rotterdam generally
and on the formal planning for Maasvlakte 2. These documents have been published by
the Ministries, the Rotterdam Port Company, and others.
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In many ways, the case study illuminates challenges to governance that are
distinct to the political, economic and environmental context of the Netherlands in the
twenty-first century. Traditionally, policymaking in the Netherlands has been conducted
through a corporatist style of government in which individuals are represented by elected
representatives in Parliament and through the participation of inclusive interest groups in
national and provincial policy-making. This system of 'double representation'-known
as the "polder model"-is breaking down as Dutch society becomes more internally
diverse, as stable domestic interests fragment, and as national institutions are forced to
acknowledge a globalizing economy and dynamic transnational policy communities.
The decline of the polder model has coincided with other factors, such as the rising
uncertainty with respect to its global competitiveness of the Port of Rotterdam and a
national reconsideration of the meaning of environmentalism. In this light, the actions
taken by the environmental organizations must be understood at least in part as a
response to a particular set of historical conditions that have created a period of
institutional transition and uncertainty in the Netherlands.
But the implications for this case extend far beyond the Netherlands. Around the
world, port development projects are facing immense, and in many cases unprecedented,
challenges. To remain viable, modern ports must be able to accommodate larger vessels
and a much greater volume of throughput, more cheaply and efficiently than ever before.
There is an increasing need for larger land area, deeper berths, and improved access to
infrastructure, so as to accommodate bigger ships and to take advantage of economies of
scale. At the same time, the potential for environmental damage is greater than ever and
the local benefits historically linked to port development can no longer be presumed. The
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collision of these two realities has resulted in a port planning that is more vitally
important to national economies but at the same time poses an unprecedented
environmental risks and often promises fewer local benefits. While many port authorities
have used economic justifications to push to get projects built whatever it takes. In light
of the great potential for social and environmental damage, the old style of top-down,
"expert" driven port planning simply isn't working anymore. The case I present with
respect to the Second Maasvlakte, provides a glimpse at what an alternative approach that
could prove extremely informative, even instructive to others involved in port planning
around the world
Overall, the case I present in this thesis provides evidence of organizations that
are trying to resolve planning dilemmas in a new way. Their actions signify a shift from
government-centered policymaking to policy formation that is more deliberative and
stakeholder-driven. While their "success" may have been incomplete with respect to
achieving an outcome that was regarded by all stakeholders as optimal, their approach
provides important insight into the way consensus building processes might look in a
"post-government" era, in which the traditional institutions through which decisions have
traditionally are no longer sufficient to deal with many pressing planning problems. The
process that took place in this case was largely experimental, at times even accidental,
and was an imperfect solution to the problem-at-hand. Nevertheless, it opened up new
opportunities for building agreements that may be instructive for similar port
redevelopment projects as well as other complex, high-stakes negotiations. For
stakeholders in such processes, this case provides important lessons regarding their
capacity to re-shape negotiations and generate alternative solutions. For government
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authorities formally responsible for such processes, it describes the emergence of a new
political landscape and implores them not to respond with resistance, but to embrace the
opportunities it presents to resolve the unprecedented challenges in an uncertain future.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
This literature review is divided into two sections that describe the two
interrelated bodies of literature that provide the analytical framework for the case that I
present in this thesis. The first section-on deliberative democracy, networks and the rise
of governance-describes a shift in the policymaking environment that is significant both
in the context of the Netherlands and with respect to trends worldwide. The second
section-on mutual-gains negotiation and consensus building-contains three different
subsections: the first provides an overview of the goals of consensus building as
articulated by the literature; the second gives a summary of the major strategies
prescribed by the literature for achieving those objectives; the third articulates major
dilemmas that can arise in employing the prescribed strategies.
A. Deliberative Democracy, Networks, and the Rise of Governance
Over the past decade, the notion of the emergence of a "network society" has
arisen concurrently within the diverse disciplines of geography, economics, sociology,
political science, and planning. Their interaction has created a multi-disciplinary dialogue
central to which is the core concept that formal institutions of government worldwide are
no longer capable of addressing modern problems. Rather, politics and policy-making on
the local, national, and international scales are increasingly characterized by a need to
call into question conventional power relationships and decision-making roles. Because
of this, policy analysis must not focus on government-which presumes that policy is
made and implemented by a centralized and hierarchically structured authority-but
should instead concentrate on governance-in which policy is made through a more
diffuse set of interactions among an interdependent network of actors.
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Political scientist Maarten Hajer describes the incapacity of traditional institutions
to resolve these dilemmas as an "institutional void" where "there are no clear rules and
norms according to which politics is to be conducted and policy measures are to be
agreed upon" (Hajer 2003: 176). Because of this, entities that once exercised a broad
mandate to create and implement policy now find themselves needing to interact
extensively with-and to a certain degree relinquish their authority to-a dispersed
network of actors. This deliberation, he argues, is necessary in order to create effective
policy. Beyond this, it has lasting impacts on the decision-making context. According to
Hajer, "actors not only deliberate to get to favorable solutions for particular problems but
while deliberating they also negotiate new institutional rules, develop new norms of
appropriate behavior and devise new conceptions of legitimate political intervention."
(Hajer 2003: 176). While filling the institutional void, these actors shape the decision-
making environment in ways that will influence how policy will be created in the future.
Patsy Healey, likewise, implores a need for innovative forms of governance that
reflect the reconfiguration of state-economy-civil relations. She argues that the traditional
policy community-clearly differentiated from other spheres of society and serving a
distinct function of setting policy agenda-actually impedes policy formation in the
modern context. She writes:
It is these divisions, discourses and practices which now seem to trap
government in modes of thinking and acting which lack the flexibility to
respond to new ways of living, new ways of doing business in a globalizing
context and new cultural awareness of the significance of environment and
place qualities. As many now articulate, the challenge is to develop
relations between the spheres of civil society, the economy and the state
which are less hierarchical and less paternalist, which are sensitive to the
needs and aspirations of diverse groups (and especially those that tend to
be marginalized) and which have a capacity to learn from diverse
knowledge resources (Healey 2003: 67).
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This is not to say that the old way of doing things can or should be
instantaneously shattered. To the contrary, Healey recognizes that the new elements of
practice that emerge often coexist and interact with the old in a period of struggle and
destabilization. Transformations in discourse can exist indefinitely on a more surface
level without penetrating into a "deeper cultural level" (Healey 2003: 69). This idea is
similar to one that is articulated by Hajer and Zonneveld who describe a "shadow
structure" that often exists parallel to the official planning system (Hajer and Zonneveld
2000). It is not until the new modes of interaction permeate the core infrastructure of
relationships and power dynamics that governance-driven by networks and
deliberation--can dominate.
Links between notions of deliberative democracy and environmental planning and
policy have also emerged. Sabel, Fund and Karkkainen suggest that the environmentalist
movement in the United States has embraced "a novel form of democracy that combines
the virtues of localism and decentralization with the discipline of national coordination"
(Sabel, Fung, and Karkkainen: 1999). They argue that the new environmentalism stands
in sharp contrast to the once-dominant NIMBY (for "Not In My Backyard") behavior
characterized by antagonism and positioning against development in one's immediate
vicinity without objection to similar development elsewhere. What Sabel, Fund and
Karkkainen present is not just a shift in attitudes about environmentalism but a new type
of interaction between spheres of society through which parties can deal with complex
environmental dilemmas. This interaction involves the formulation of alliances between
parties traditionally viewed as oppositional (such as environmentalists and industrialists)
and greater information exchange between levels of government. As a result, top-down
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environmental regulation has declined and has made way for a more decentralized
approach to policy-making. This kind of policy relies upon the accumulation of
knowledge among local actors who together take shared responsibility for generating it.
Networks tend to arise organically, responding to societal needs rather than being
constructed deliberately in order to address them. Nevertheless, network management has
arisen as a focus for some scholars who claim that networks can be influenced to take on
more desirable forms. Network management aims at "coordinating strategies of actors
with different goals and preferences with regard to a certain problem or policy measure
within an existing network of interorganizational relations" (Kickert, Klijn, and
Koppenjan 1997: 10). The potential for networks to be managed signifies that case
studies like the one presented in this thesis can be very valuable to practitioners who
grasp their logic and potential. They can look to other cases as examples inform the ways
in which they try to develop and shape their own networks.
Equally important as developing an understanding the shift from government to
deliberative policymaking through governance is determining how to study it. Maarten
Hajer and Hendrick Wagenar put forth that such analysis should be employ an
interpretive, as opposed to a positivist, approach (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003). Interpretive
methods, which recognize the biases of perspective and aim to understand phenomena
rather than explain and evaluate them, are naturally applicable to deliberative policy
analysis; they allow us to pursue "a varied search for understandings of society to
facilitate meaningful and legitimate political actions, agreed upon by mutual interaction,
to improve the collective quality of life" (Hajer 2003). Research should to be empirical in
nature according to Hajer, although the findings from this research can then be used to
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make normative assessments about if and to what extent the new policymaking processes
that occur in an network society contribute to outcomes that we perceive to be more
democratic, inclusive or legitimate.
Network theory highlights the interdependence between actors in the
policymaking environment. Closely related, theories of deliberative democracy describe a
distinct shift from policymaking that hinges on the centrality of a formal authority to
societal dependence on networks. In this thesis, I describe a scenario in which a planning
process the deliberations through which policy was formulated moved partially out of the
realm of government to a forum that was controlled by other nongovernmental actors. I
present, therefore, an account of practice that can be framed very naturally by these
theories. In keeping with Hajer and Wagenaar's approach, my methods are interpretive. I
provide a multi-perspective, empirical description that is intended to provide and
understanding of a particular case, not an explanation of or judgment on it.
B. Mutual-Gains Negotiation and Consensus Building
The majority of consensus building literature focuses on getting parties who think
their interests are at odds over a particular issue or problem to agree to a solution to it that
they all feel is advantageous to them. It aims to delineate methods through which the
dynamics of negotiations and the relationships between actors can be changed in order to
provide these opportunities for them to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes. Howard
Raiffa describes this goal as facilitating consensus among "cooperative antagonists" who
may naturally be predisposed to be slightly distrustful of each other and likely to indulge
in strategic posturing (Raiffa 1982: 18). The goal of mutual gains negotiations is to alter
the perceptions of stakeholders that their situation is "zero-sum" in nature, where the
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gains by one party necessarily mean the losses of another. In doing so, parties come to
feel that their interests are not inherently contradictory, but in fact interdependent. Parties
will then come to believe it is possible to achieve "value added" outcomes whereby they
will all gain more by coming to a consensus then they would by not pursuing and
agreement (Raiffa 1982. Lax and Sebenius 1986). This generates a sense of collective
interest among stakeholders, allowing them work collaboratively toward a shared vision
for of a desirable outcome.
i. Goals
In their seminal book Getting to Yes, Roger Fisher and William Ury describe the
standard approach to negotiation as one of as positional bargaining. They argue that this
type of interaction does not provide the conditions needed for stakeholders to formulate
consensus with which all parties will be satisfied. They advocate instead for a type of
"principled negotiation," which is characterized by certain practices and aims to achieve
three goals: the production of more optimal results for all stakeholders; greater efficiency;
and the strengthening of, or at least minimization of damage to, the relationship between
parties (Fisher and Ury 1982). They emphasize the first goal-to produce outcomes in
any given negotiation perceived as beneficial by all parties.
Herbert Kelman, on the other hand, presents the third objective-the
strengthening of long-term relationships-as the most important aim of consensus
building processes. He states that the goal of any negotiation should be for "a
transformation of the relationship between parties." (Kelman 1996: 99). He emphasizes
that negotiations should set an ambitious goal of creating and maintaining "the basis for a
stable, long-term peace and cooperative, mutually enhancing relationship that contributes
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to the welfare and development of both societies" (Kelman 1996: 104). In this light, the
true aim of consensus building is larger than the outcome of any particular process; it is
the transformation of relationships themselves, an idea that aligns well with Hajer's
notion that deliberation establishes new norms for future interaction (Hajer 2003).
Other scholars give varying weight to the goals of achieving a mutually desirable
outcome for a particular process and changing the relationships between stakeholders. In
most instances, the two aims are portrayed as complimentary; the achievement of an
outcome for a specific negotiation process that all stakeholders support is indicative of a
transformation in how the parties relate to each other. The former is, in effect, a result of
the latter. The question that remains is how to sustain the new dynamic between
stakeholders to ensure that it lasts.
ii. Strategies
The majority of literature in on negotiation and consensus building is prescriptive
in nature, providing a "how to" guide either for participants or the managing authority in
a negotiation process. James Sebenius describes this as an "asymmetrical
descriptive/prescriptive approach" whereby a negotiation analysis seeks to create
prescriptive advice for third parties that assumes "intelligent, goal seeking" action by
parties, though not perfect knowledge or complete rationality (Sebinius 1996: 20). This
literature presents strategies for achieving mutually acceptable agreements, which are
then presumed to be generalizable to a broad range of conflicts.
In The Consensus Building Handbook, Larry Susskind identifies five specific
steps to be followed in reaching a consensus: convening, clarifying responsibilities,
deliberating, deciding, and implementing agreements (Susskind 1999). For each of these
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steps he prescribes certain actions that should be taken in order to bring parties closer to
an agreement. These prescriptions are largely targeted at entities that are responsible for
managing negotiation processes. Some of the recommendations are very specific (ie.
"establish a mailing list") while others are broader and are left up to practitioners to
interpret (ie. "express concerns in an unconditionally constructive manner"). Combined,
the prescribed strategies aim to help parties "do better than what no agreement holds in
store for them" (Susskind 1999: 12).
Other scholars put forth different variations on Susskind's prescriptions. The
majority, however, utilize the same approach of advocating for universal strategies that
can be employed in a wide range of disparate situations. Below the most common
prescriptions for consensus building literature are summarized.
Acknowledge stakeholder differences
Fisher and Ury put forth that the first task in getting parties talking productively
with each other is to "separate people from the problem" (Fisher and Ury 1982). This is
accomplished when stakeholders actively seek to identify each other's most fundamental
values and viewpoints, however seemingly irrational or emotionally driven they might
be. In doing this it becomes easier for stakeholders to empathize with each other while
negotiating. Rather than discounting each other's backgrounds, perspectives and feelings,
by acknowledging them they can then determine jointly how both to address them and to
divorce them from the "substantive" issues on the table.
A different take on this need to acknowledge the differences between stakeholders
is offered by Gurevitch who claims that before seeking to understand each other
stakeholders must try to not understand each other. He puts forth that parties will
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inevitably bring into any negotiation their own assumptions about others. Because of this,
participants in a negotiation must first accept their differences, rather than presuming that
they already know the perspective of the other. He states, "In a moment of not
understanding, what had been considered 'understood' is relinquished as mere image."
This is a moment of "making strange" during which the actor is liberated from the image
that she has projected onto the other's experience. (Gurevitch 1989: 162).
Implicit in both the ideas of Fisher and Ury and of Gurevitch is the prescription
for a deliberate and straightforward acknowledgement at the start of any process of
negotiation of differences between parties' backgrounds and viewpoints. Beyond this, the
aspects of stakeholders' perspectives that may be perceived as less rational and more
influenced by emotions should not be ignored. Rather, they should be identified and
ascribed value as motivations that can and should factor into the discussions as they move
forward.
Get at interests
Often when stakeholders come to the negotiating table they feel that they have a
clear sense of their position on the issue at hand, a position that they believe is
immutable. If this position is perceived as inherently contradictory to that of another
stakeholder they will enter the debate already convinced that consensus cannot be
achieved. Consensus building literature argues that getting at what is behind stated
positions and focusing on underlying interests is therefore critical.
Fisher and Ury argue that getting at interests provides opportunities for consensus
building even in situations where stakeholders may initially have perceived it to be
impossible (Fisher and Ury 1982). Kelman explains that any negotiation process must
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address parties' innermost needs, which may be independent from their more material,
measurable, and quantifiable wants. The unfulfilled needs that cause conflict are,
according to Kelman, not just material, but also psychological. While psychological
needs may be more difficult to identify initially, they also offer great potential for
simultaneous fulfillment for all parties as they are as not inherently zero-sum in nature;
no party needs to give up its own psychological needs in order to fulfill another's
(Kelman 1996). Susskind and Thomas Larmer put forth that in many circumstances a
conflict assessment can be conducted in order to determine who stakeholding interests are
and where they agree and disagree (Susskind and Thomas Larmer 1999). But whether
interests are material or psychological, and whatever tools are employed to get at them,
the lesson remains the same: seeming inherent incompatibilities in positions can be
circumvented by getting stakeholders to talk about and address the more basic interests
behind them.
Broaden the scope of the debate
Because stakeholders are likely to have a broad range of interests that extend
beyond the core focus of any negotiation, one of the most valuable strategies for
satisfying participants in a negotiation keep its scope broad. Fisher and Ury refer to this
as the need to generate "a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do" (Fisher and
Ury 1982). Conversely, it is essential not to eliminate certain ideas and issues before
stakeholders have had ample opportunity to explore the full range of solution ideas that
are important to them. By prematurely dismissing these ideas, creativity is stunted and
the opportunity for concepts that might be desired, but deemed as unfeasible, to be
reformed into something that could actually work practically. Only when parties come to
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form a common ground about their goals and objectives can they systematically
determine their constraints and how to deal with them (Kelman 1996).
Build Trust
Perhaps the most fundamental tenet of consensus building literature is the notion
of building trust among stakeholders. Much consensus building literature draws upon
game theory in order to explain the notions of the importance of building trust over time
(see, for example, Raiffa 1982). They liken the many micronegotiations that take place in
a consensus building process to a game that is repeated many times. In order for any
player to induce other actors to behave in ways that are advantageous to them, they must
show with their actions that they will behave likewise. Simply expressing trustworthiness
to the other actors is not enough; trust building must occur in the "sphere of activities,
and not of ideas or wills" (Davis, quoting Parker Follett, 1989). The prescription arising
out of this is for stakeholders to behave in such a way that demonstrates trust from the
beginning, respecting and sticking to agreements and making meaningful concessions,
and to maintain this behavior throughout the course of negotiations.
Acquire constituent support
Participants in a negotiation often face what is referred to as a "two-table"
problem. This dilemma arises when they need support from their constituency-such as
members of an organization or citizens in a politician's jurisdiction-in order to for other
stakeholders to believe that they can and will stand behind agreements made in the
negotiation process. Kelman refers to this as the need to create a supportive political
environment (Kelman 1982). Laws explains it as a dilemma that arises when
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representatives come to find that they cannot negotiate within a process without working
to keep their constituents informed about it. He states:
A seamless as it may appear to a representative caught up in the process,
it may be jarring to those outside the process who suddenly confront their
agents talking about each other and the problem in new terms.
Representatives had better be able to explain themselves if they have any
hope of getting their constituents to approve.
(Laws 1999: 270).
The prescription for handling this problem involves maintaining a very careful balance
between fully dedicating themselves to the collective interest of the participants of the
negotiation and ensuring that constituents feel their interests are not compromised in the
process.
Come to knowledge jointly
In order for stakeholders to come to a consensus, knowledge--even that which
seems to be "purely" of a technical or scientific nature--cannot be imposed upon them.
While it is often the immediate reaction of those managing process to look to experts to
settle scientific or technical questions, consensus building literature emphasizes the need
for stakeholders to take a part in that knowledge formation. Rather than presuming that
knowledge is something fixed and certain, it should be considered as inherently
subjective and therefore worthy of debate and exploration from multiple perspectives.
The standard prescription put forth to achieve this aim is to initiate a joint-fact
finding process. Susskind sets out a procedure in which all participants agree on (a) what
information is sought, (b) how it should be generated (ie., by whom and using which
methods), and (c) how gaps among technical sources will be handled (Susskind 1999:
46). Ehrmann and Stinson argue that such a process creates a number of advantages
including that they provide the opportunity for participants to learn about the scientific
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foundations of various arguments, they produce agreements that are "more credible, more
creative, and more durable" than they would be otherwise, and they enable parties to
build strong relationships (Ehrmann and Stinson 1999). Even if stakeholders interpret the
significance of the knowledge differently, they will share a sense that it is legitimate
which will allow them to move forward with discussions and they will have strengthened
the effectiveness of the process itself in doing so.
iii. Dilemmas
The strategies that are prescribed in order to achieve consensus are not always
easy to adopt. Consensus building literature presents a range of potential dilemmas that
are likely to arise in the process. Three of the most common dilemmas are presented
below.
Commitment
Acquiring commitment from actors that they will stick by the agreements
they make in a negotiation process presents one of the most difficult challenges to
consensus building. Parties often fail to commit out of fear that others won't.
Susskind puts forth that in situations when participatory organizations are more ad
hoc and when the structure is one of more dispersed power and responsibility,
commitment issues are likely to pose problems. The commitment of parties is
likely to be viewed with less skepticism when part of permanent
organizations and in hierarchically run organizations because top management
will hold participants accountable to their promises (Susskind 1999: 51). But in
either situation, if not addressed, the inability to acquire a commitment threatens
to erode trust among participants and to unravel the progress made in the process.
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Legitimacy
It is argued in the literature that interactive consensus building processes in which
the full range of stakeholders are at the table will produce outcomes that are perceived as
legitimate. But what happens when stakeholders are not organized enough to participate?
Or when stakeholder interests fall too far outside of what is perceived as relevant to the
specific issues at hand top be incorporated? Laws states that there are some cases where
groups may be unable to participate or unwilling to commit the resources to do so. In
such cases, certain stakeholders may be systematically or de facto excluded. While
strategies can be employed in which participants can take into account the perspectives of
non-present parties, this still can result in a difficult "tension" regarding the legitimacy of
the process (Laws 1999: 264).
Consensus building literature also posits that legitimacy is achieved when the
facilitator of a negotiation is perceived to be neutral by all parties. Susskind explains that
legitimacy is hard to achieve when a party with a stake in the outcome of the process is
charged with facilitating it becauce "in the final analysis, there is reason to worry that a
stakeholder might use a facilitative authority to advance his or her own interests at the
expense of others" (Susskind 1999: 7). Elliot writes that in most cases the facilitator
should therefore come from outside a stakeholding organization that is entirely
disconnected from interested parties (Eliot 1999:231). But Elliot also identifies four
distinct criteria by which a facilitator can be judged-ability to understand the context,
ability to design and manage the process, impartiality, and ability to handle sensitive
information. His identification of these criteria implores a complex range of factors can
and should determine who the facilitator ought to be, making it very possible for
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situations to arise when complete independence might be outweighed by other
considerations.
Implementation
Even the most broadly accepted consensus, which adheres to all of the best
practice tenets as described above, may not be implementable. William Potapchuk and
Jarle Crocker explain that there is a correlation between the scope of the problems
addressed and the number of stakeholders involved in a process and the implementation
challenges it is likely to face; the broader the scope and the larger the number of
stakeholders, the more difficult implementation will be. One of the core issues they
identify is that "while new ways of making public decisions continue to spread in use and
popularity, the mechanisms for their implementation are usually found in traditional
institutions and processes" (Potapachuk and Crocker 1999: 529). They argue that the
"product" of collaborative decision-making often extends beyond an agreement about a
particular issue to include the creation of "new relationships among stakeholders, novel
and shared understandings of the problems being addressed, and more constructive norms
of behavior of individuals, organizations, and communities (Potapachuk and Crocker
1999: 531). These outcomes are often not well integrated into existing institutions. While
an agreement may be made on paper, these agreements may require a change in
institutional "ethic" that does not naturally follow.
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III. BACKGROUND
A. Brief History of the Port of Rotterdam
The history of the Port of Rotterdam has been one of continual expansion toward
the sea. The port's origins date back to the second half of the 13th century, before the City
of Rotterdam was founded, when a fishing village arose where he Rotte tributary flowed
into the bend in the River Meuze (Maas). Gradually growing over the course of several
hundred years, the Port's first harbors were constructed between 1600 and 1620. During
the next three-hundred years, it continued to grow into a large-scale bulk cargo port
serving Europe. The port's first great boom era occurred in the first half of the 2 0 th
century, with the construction of two petroleum storage and distribution facilities and a
refinery. While it suffered large-scale destruction during the Second World War, the port
was reconstructed in the 1950s and continued to expand. By 1962 the Port of Rotterdam
was the largest port in the world.
In the mid-1960s, the port faced enormous pressure not only to expand its land
area, but also to deepen its harbor basins in order to accommodate the steady growth in
the size of ships being used for transporting container cargo. In order to remain globally
competitive, the Government was convinced that the Port of Rotterdam had to deepen its
access channel, and it granted permission for companies to engage in a series of dredging
projects through the late 1960s and 1970s. These projects opened the way for much larger
transatlantic containerships, inspiring the creation of a container transshipment company,
Europe Combined Terminals (ECT), and providing the opportunity for the further
development of the Port of Rotterdam, now Europe's primary port not only for bulk
cargo but also for container handling.
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By the 1970s, the Port of Rotterdam had expanded as much as landside
constraints would allow, but demand for more container space continued to increase. The
First Maasvlakte was the Government's response to this problem. For the first time the
port area was built out into the ocean through infill on top of an existing sandbank that
extended into the North Sea. The Maasvlakte extended the land area of the Port of
Rotterdam by 3,000 hectares to 10,000 hectares total, accommodating a new oil terminal,
an ore and coal transshipment company, and a new container terminal.' With creation of
the first Maasvlakte, container transshipment, which had been increasing steadily for
decades, exploded. In 1985, container transshipment in the Port of Rotterdam amounted
to 2.7 million TEU (1 TEU = 20 feet container) annually. Ten years later this number had
doubled.2 Investments in rail and distribution facilities further secured the Port of
Rotterdam's position as Europe's unequivocally dominant port.
Today, the Port of Rotterdam spans forty kilometers, running from the city center,
along the River Maas and to the North Sea. Its most heavily utilized land areas are the
more recently constructed portions, further west, as these are the areas that can best
accommodate the large, modern ships and are best connected to intermodal transportation
infrastructure. At the same time, many of the older port areas, closer to the city's
residential communities, have fallen into decline. Vacant shipyards and contaminated lots
now characterize the waterfront in these areas, many of which have been deemed by the
Port Company as unsuitable for modern maritime industrial activities. The distinctly
different character of the old and new segments of the port, and the discrepancies in
] Transformation of Rotterdam Docklands, Edward Hupkes, Port of Rotterdam, 2003
2 Transformation of Rotterdam Docklands, Edward Hupkes, Port of Rotterdam, 2003
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opinion regarding the potential for each of the two areas to accommodate new demand,
have become central issues in modem debates over the port's future.
B. Economic and Socioeconomic Context
In 2000, the direct gross added value of the Port of Rotterdam and industrial area
amounted to 6.2 billion euro, which was 1.7 % of the Dutch Gross National Product. 3
Taking into consideration also its indirect economic impacts, the Port of Rotterdam can
be considered the economic engine of the national economy. In the report Port Vision
2020, the Municipality of Rotterdam in coordination with the Port Company articulated a
long-range economic strategy for the port which called for increasing throughput by 40%
in the next fifteen years and focusing on the growth sectors of containers, the chemical
industry and other new industrial processes. 4 This anticipated large-scale growth
indicates that the Port Company and the Ministries are committed to ensuring that Port of
Rotterdam will continue to play a vital role in the economy of the Netherlands.
But in the twenty-first century, many economists worry that global competition,
especially from Asia, poses a serious threat to Rotterdam's economic hegemony. While
total throughput in the Port of Rotterdam has increased annually over the past decade, the
relative share of cargo that will continue to come through the port as compared to total
shipping worldwide is less certain. In 2004, the ports of Shanghai and Singapore
surpassed the Port of Rotterdam as the largest ports in the world as measured by total tons
of cargo handled.5 Some theorize that the growth of Asian ports could compliment
Rotterdam's port activities and therefore result in a net positive economic impact on it.
3 Port of Rotterdam website, http://www.portofrotterdam.com/abouttheport/UK/index.asp, 5 May 2005
4 Port Vision 2020, the Municipality of Rotterdam and the Port of Rotterdam,
http://www.portofrotterdam.com/organizations/UK/Themes/PortVision202/Index.asp, 5 May 2005
5 The Associated Press. Port of Rotterdam grows in 2004, but drops claim to 'world's largest' title, 30 December 2004
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But as Asian ports continue to reduce import and export dues and offer tax incentives to
port industries looking for a place to locate, the reality remains that Rotterdam is
beginning to lose its market share of global trade. Beyond this, the psychological impact
of losing the status of "largest port in the world" has had a profound impact on many who
are concerned with the port's economic future.
The growth in the port's contribution to the national economy over the past
decades has not been mirrored with respect to local economic impacts. Beginning in the
late-1960s, the advent of containers and the adoption of more technologically advanced
logistics networks has resulted to a far less labor-intensive transfer of goods even as total
port area has expanded. In the last fifteen years, twenty thousand jobs have been lost in
the Port of Rotterdam.6 Many of these jobs had been held by individuals whose families
had been employed in the port for generations. So while the Port of Rotterdam has
continued to contribute more and more each year to the national economy of the
Netherlands, the impact on the City of Rotterdam and the surrounding region with respect
to employment, has steadily declined.
The physical reorientation of the port away from residential areas has had a
secondary negative economic impact on the local context. As the old port areas fall into
decline, nearby residential neighborhoods once activated by industrial activity, and once
attractive to generations of port workers for their proximity to stable employment, are
becoming less attractive places to live. Property values have fallen as the physical
environment has deteriorated and the public perception of these neighborhoods has
worsened. The new residents of these neighborhoods-many of whom are immigrants
6 Matthijs van Muijen, "Sustainable Development of Rotterdam Port: Striking a balance between city, harbour,
economy and environment" Paper for the European Sea Ports Organization conference on Sustainable Port
Development, Genoa, 22 November 2002
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with limited Dutch language ability and or marketable skills-face increasingly difficult
job prospects. While the sources of the physical decline and rise in unemployment in
these neighborhoods must be attributed to a broad range of factors, the combination of
the loss of port-related local employment opportunities in combination with physical
blight of the abandoned industrial landscape are undoubtedly major contributing factors.
D. Legal Context
i. National Legislation
The Spatial Planning Key Decision (PKB) procedure was introduced in the early
1970s, although it was not integrated into the Spatial Planning Act until 1985. It sets
procedural and public participation requirements for any planning project of national
impact. It comprises four parts:
· "PKB Part 1 consists of the drafting of the key national planning decision; the
government presents its policy plans."
* "PKB Part 2 consists of responses to the draft key national planning decision,
including comments by citizens and social organisations, results of inter-
governmental consultation and, if requested, the recommendations of an outside
advisory council."
* "PKB Part 3 is the government position that is submitted to the Lower House for
approval; after the Lower House has reviewed it, the policy document - possibly
in revised form - is submitted to the Upper House for approval."
* "PKB Part 4 is the national planning decision approved by both Houses of the
States General of the Netherlands."
These guidelines are designed to protect the right of the public to express its
interests with respect to a project of national significance. Any authority drafting such a
plan is legally obligated to strictly follow the steps as outlined. To a large degree, the
7 Han Frankfort, Ministerie VROM/Rijksplanologische Dienst, "Dutch Government Drafting New Policy on Wadden
Sea," Wadden Sea Newsletter 2000.
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second part of the PKB process epitomizes the Dutch polder model in action. It allows
groups the opportunity to consult with the government, presumably through their
traditional interest-based organizations. While it does not guarantee that the government
will incorporate these interests into the submission to the Lower and Upper Houses of
Parliament, it does grant these groups the right to negotiate with the Ministries in a highly
structured manner at this key stage in the planning process.
ii. European Union Directives
The European Union's Birds and Habitats Directives are designed to protect
biodiversity of EU member states by restricting development in designated areas. The
Birds Directive was initiated in 1979, and identified 181 species of endangered birds for
which EU Member States are required to designate Special Protection Areas (SPAs). The
Habitats Directive, which was initiated in 1992, aims to protect wildlife species and their
habitats. Member States must identify these areas and to create special management plans
to designate them as Sites of Community Importance (SCIs). Development projects are
allowed to take place within SPAs and SCIs only if it is demonstrated that the project is
deemed to be vital to a State's national interests. Such projects can also only be pursued
if certain procedural steps are taken to ensure that the needs of those who claim to be
negatively impacted by it are addressed. n the Netherlands, the Minister of Transport,
Public Works and Water Management and the State Secretary for Agriculture, Nature
Conservation and Fisheries, the bodies responsible for enforcing the Directives.
The Birds and Habitats Directives are relevant to the case that I present in this
thesis because three sites in the region of the potential land reclamation area for the
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Second Maasvlakte-Voordelta, Kwade Hoek and Voornes Duin-are designated as
SPAs and these three sites, in addition to the Kop van Groene, are also SCIs within the
framework of the Habitats Directive. Because of this, the PMR's task included
compliance not only with national legislation, but also with the EU Birds and Habitats
Directives.
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IV. CASE STUDY
A. Precedents to the Rotterdam Mainport Development Project (PMR)
By the early 1990s, it was the clear position of the Rotterdam Port Company and
the City of Rotterdam that the existing area in the Port of Rotterdam would not be
sufficient to handle the projected growth in deep-sea container shipping and other
industrial activity in the immediate future. In 1993, in the wake of mounting pressure by
these stakeholders, the Government initiated a study to explore the question of whether or
not the existing port area in the Port of Rotterdam would need to expand in order to meet
this projected demand. Following from this, a national debate was held from the
beginning of 1995 through July of 1997, called the Rotterdam Mainport Exploration of
Space Shortage (Verkenning Ruimtetekort Mainport Rotterdam, or VERM, in Dutch).
Formally, the purpose of this debate was to "map out the problem and to examine the
usefulness and need for taking measures."8 This debate concluded with the determination
by the Cabinet that there would indeed be a space shortage in the Port of Rotterdam in the
immediate future. This prompted the establishment the Rotterdam Mainport Development
Project (PMR), a comprehensive planning process to determine how new space for the
growing needs of the port would be met.
B. The Actors
Stakeholders and relevant parties in the negotiations on the space shortage and the
potential expansion of the Port of Rotterdam included those that follow:
8 Rotterdam Mainport Development Project, "PMR On Course," June 1999, p. 5
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Rotterdam Port Company (Havenbedrijf Rotterdam N. V.)
The Rotterdam Port Company has nearly 1,300 employees and the responsibility
to manage almost 26,000 acres of industrial area and associated infrastructure and
facilities in and around Rotterdam Harbor.9 According to the Articles of the Port
Company, its objectives are, "to operate the port installations and in such context to
strengthen the position of the Rotterdam port and industrial zone within a European
perspective, in the short and long term."'0 During the negotiations that are the focus of
this thesis, the Rotterdam Port Company was a private entity, although most stocks were
held by governmental agencies, including the Municipality of Rotterdam, the Province
of South Holland, and the State. On the first day of January 2004 the Rotterdam Port
Company became a government corporation.
The Ministries
Five National Government Ministries were involved in the negotiations that are
the focus of this thesis:
* Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management
* Ministry of Housing, Regional Development and the Environment (VROM)
* Ministry of Economic Affairs
* Ministry of Agriculture, Nature, Conservation and Fisheries
* Ministry of Finance
The Ministry of Transport was designated Project Minister for the planning process,
providing them with the mandate to organize, manage, and see through to completion the
PKB process.
9 Port of Rotterdam website,
http://www.portofrotterdam.com/organizations/UK/Companylnformation/CompanyProfile/Index.asp
10 Unofficial translation of the Articles of Association of Havenbedrijf Rotterdam N.V. with corporate seat in
Rotterdam the Netherlands dated 31 December 2003, p. 1
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First and Second Chambers of Parliament
The Second Chamber of Parliament is required to approve the Core Planning
Decision (PKB). Pending their approval, the First Chamber is also required to approve it.
The Council of State (Raad van State)
The Council of State has two separate functions: it is the Government's chief
advisory body, and it is the highest administrative tribunal.
Local, regional, and national government authorities
Several local and regional authorities were part of the formal planning process for
the PMR from its outset: the Province of South Holland, the Regional Authority
Rijnmond (ROM-Rijnmond), the Municipality of Rotterdam, and several smaller
municipalities in the Rotterdam region. The Province of South Holland (one of twelve
provinces in the Netherlands) includes the City of Rotterdam in addition to the cities of
the Hague (its capital), Delft and Leiden. Provincial authorities are responsible for
environmental management, spatial planning, energy supply, social work, sport and
cultural affairs within their jurisdictions. ROM-Rijnmond is a partnership between three
layers of government-the National Government, the Province of South Holland and
Stadsregio Rotterdam, a coalition between seventeen municipalities in the greater
Rotterdam region. The Municipality of Rotterdam is the local authority governing the
City. Also important to this case, but not formally part of the PMR process, was the
statutory agency of the Dutch Fisheries Board (Productschap Vis).
Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs)
Non-governmental organizations and other interest groups were given a
consultative role during the PMR process when it was initiated, in keeping with the
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requirements of the PKB process. These NGOs included the environmental groups
Natuurmonumenten, a national NGO, and Zuid-Hollandse Milieufederatie, a provincial
NGO. Also involved was a group of seven environmental organizations organized in
1997 under the name Consept to form an alliance that would speak with a unified voice
within the PMR process. A representative from Zuid-Hollandse Milieufederatie, Arno
Steeklenburg, acted as spokesperson for their interests throughout the process. Other
NGOs that were included in a similar consultative role and eventually were given a more
formal role in negotiations through a new process (ONR) that was initiated after the
described crisis point in negotiations were:
* The National Driving and Recreation Organization (ANWB)
* The largest trade union confederation in the Netherlands (FNV)
* An association representing the logistics sector in the Netherlands
(Nederland Distributieland)
* The Association of Water Boards (UvW)
* The Society for Dutch Enterprises (VNO-NCW)
* The Ports and Industries Association Rotterdam (Deltalinqs)
Two NGOs that also proved to be important stakeholders, although they were not
officially represented in the ONR process, were the National Union of Fishers
(Vissersbond) and a regional branch of the National farmer's organization (WLTO).
The Facilitator
An independent facilitator, Loek Hermans, was hired to run the formal PMR
process. He was replaced by Hans Alders in 2000.
The Consultants
The DHV Group is an international consulting and engineering firm, based in
Amersfoort, the Netherlands. DHV was hired by the Ministry of Housing, Spatial
Planning and the Environment to assist with the management of the PMR process.
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C. The Rotterdam Mainport Development Project (PMR)
The VERM debates had concluded with the determination that new space would
have to be found to accommodate the expected growth in port industries. They also had
initiated a broad conversation about the impact of potential new port development on the
surrounding region and the need to address local environmental, economic, and quality of
life issues. For this reason, the Central Government defined a "dual objective" for the
PMR process at the outset, which was put forth as:
1. To strengthen the position of the Rotterdam mainport by seeking solutions in the
Rotterdam region and in the Southwest Netherlands to the indicated space
shortage and industrial activities in the Rotterdam port area;
2. To improve the quality of the living environment in the Rotterdam region by
using the potential offered to resolve the space shortage. 
An Inception Note in 1998 established the PMR organization's mandate to find solutions
to both of these issues. It also determined that the PMR would consist of five ministries,
ROM-Rijnmond and that the Province of South Holland and that the Ministry of
Transport, Public Works and Water Management was given authority to act as the Project
Minister for PMR. Another Governmental Deliberation Group (BOM) was also formed
as part of the PMR, and included the local governments of the Municipality of Rotterdam
and the smaller surrounding municipalities.
With respect to the first objective, to address the space shortage in the Port of
Rotterdam, the Ministries put forth at the start of the PMR process three potential options
as alternatives worthy of explanation:
· Better utilization of the existing Rotterdam port area;
· Utilization of the port areas of Moerdijk, Vlissingen and Terneuzen (ports in
Zeeland, in the southwest Netherlands);
l Rotterdam Mainport Development Project, "PMR On Course," June 1999
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* Expansion of the existing port by adding a new stretch of land (Maasvlakte 2) into
the North Sea, to the west of the current Maasvlakte.
But while formally the question of whether or not the Port of Rotterdam should expand
was left open, the perception among many stakeholders was that the idea to expand the
port with a Second Maasvlakte was already deeply embedded in the Ministries' minds as
the preferable choice. While formally three alternatives were placed on the table,
according to many the burden of proof rested on those who argued against expansion.
Fred Heuer, who was from the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water
Management and acted as Chairman of the Ministerial Board for PMR explained:
The idea to expand the port of Rotterdam was already a long-existing
idea. And the vision of the Port, over there, was to expand it with another
2,000 hectares. And when they wrote down this ambition it was rather
straightforward for them that that would happen and it would happen
smoothly and easily. And the central government would hardly interfere
with it. They would just give them money for the basic infrastructure and
that's it.12
With respect to the second objective of the PMR, a working group was formed,
which was given the responsibility of determining how to interpret and assign various
indicators for the notion of improving the "quality of the living environment" in the
Rotterdam region. This working group comprised members of the Ministries of Housing,
Spatial Planning and the Environment, Transport and Public Works and Economic
Affairs, as well as the Province of South Holland and the Rijnmond Environmental
Department. 13 But the meaning of the second target, at the start, was not very well
defined. Harry van Huut, a civil servant from the Ministry of Housing who was
responsible for coordinating the group, explained, "It has to do something about safety of
12 Interview with Fred Heuer
13 A.F.L. Slob and H.R. van Huut, "Sustainable Development in the Port of Rotterdam," Contribution to the 7 th
Sustainable Cities Ports International Conference," 6-9 December 2000, Marseille.
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within the town, or living environment...Could mean anything. So it was very difficult
to...fill in this second target." 14 While fairly early on in the process it had been agreed
with the NGOs that some component of this objective would include 750 hectares of new
nature and recreation space in the region, the exact details of where and how this space
would be built were not defined and little else with respect to what the second objective
would entail had been discussed.
Initially, the environmental organizations felt that the Project Director, Huub van
Zwam and the consultant team he hired from DHV had designed an effective way to
engage them as consultative parties. At van Zwam's direction, DHV initiated a series of
in-depth interviews with the non-governmental stakeholders in order to construct a sense
of their collective interests. This entailed building up one central document, to which
stakeholders had the opportunity to add their comments and suggestions in a series of
rounds. Through that process, Arno Steeklenburg-who negotiated on behalf of Zuid-
Hollandse Milieufederatie (the provincial environmental NGO) and Consept (the alliance
of seven environmental NGOs)-said that through the DHV process "we learned a lot
about our own position, about the positions of others, but also about how do you bridge,
how do you find connections with other interests."'5 The consultative role that the NGOs
were given at the outset of the PMR process was in keeping with past planning processes
undertaken by the Port Company and others in which they were accustomed to
participate. While they were not given the power at this stage in the process to make any
decisions with respect to what would or would not be included in the first stage of the
PKB, they could offer their advice and the Ministries would commit to "consider it."
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'4 Interview with Harry van Huut
15 Interview with Arno Steeklenberg
Van Zwam made a conscious effort to maintain his position as a neutral organizer
of the process, as opposed to a representative of his Ministry's interests. While members
of the Ministry served on the steering committee for the project, Van Zwam considered
his role to be entirely separate from theirs. Heuer explained, "my project director said I
don't care what the outcome is, whether it's port expansion or not. I don't care. It's not
my job to expand the port. It's my job to organize a smooth, open decision-making
process. "16 An independent facilitator was also brought in to assist in creating a sense
among participants that all points of view were welcomed into discussion, regardless of
whether or not they aligned with the Ministries'.
But while the representatives from NGOs acknowledged that Van Zwam and the
consultant team had taken specific actions in order to bring them into the process in a
consultative capacity, some still felt doubtful about the extent to which the concerns they
raised would truly influence the actual decision-making by the Ministries. As
Steekelenberg explained, "They [the Ministries] had their own steering group [the BOM]
and then connected to the steering group was... sort of response group...when everything
is ready they show it to you and then you have to applaud."1 7 Coupled with the lack of
clarity on the meaning of the second objective, the fact that Ministry of Transport made
no commitment to incorporating the interests of the NGOs, caused many in these
organizations to question whether or not their participation in the process would in the
end have a real impact on its outcome.
Their skepticism derived in part from their recent experience in interacting with
the Ministries in a consultative capacity in other large-scale projects throughout the
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16 Interview with Fred Heuer
17 Interview with Arno Steeklenberg
Netherlands, one in particular-the construction of the Betuwe Freight Line, a train line
from Rotterdam to the border of Germany. This project originally had been put forth by
the Ministries as an environmentally-focused initiative that would transfer much of the
freight being transported by truck on the roads to trains. As the process developed and
new studies were released, however, certain groups came to believe that in fact the
project would not produce the positive environmental impacts that had initially been
touted. Feeling that the Ministries had misrepresented the project from the outset and had
not allowed them to participate in such a way that might have produced a more
environmentally desirable result, some environmental organizations that originally had
supported the project, took a strong position against it. Their trust, they felt, had been
violated. As the PMR process got underway, this breach was still fresh in their minds.18
The historic relationship between the port development projects and the
participating environmental organizations also contributed to the sense unease about the
extent to which the Ministries were committed to integrating their interests in to their
actual decisions. The development of the First Maasvlakte in the 1960s, which took place
before the PKB process was in place, had been deemed by the Government absolutely
essential to the national economy, and was pushed forward under these auspices. As a
result, consideration of negative impacts to the environment and efforts to mitigate these
effects were minimal. The recollection of this destruction was deeply embedded in the
organizations' institutional memories. Van Huut characterized it:
Voornes Duin, the coastal area in the Rotterdam area, is very important,
especially for Natuurmonumenten. It is an icon for them and the
realization of the First Maasvlakte more or less was the birth of ourfirst
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environmental group. So they have a lot of history in this area [because] a
very beautiful nature area was removed, flattened.19
Because of this legacy, the environmentalists felt a heightened sense of responsibility
coming into the process to ensure that the mistakes made in the construction of the First
Maasvlakte would not be permitted again. As Wilfred Alblas, who negotiated on behalf
of Natuurmonumenten, explained:
I was very insecure. The point is this area was one of the best nature
reserves the Netherlands ever had. And the former generation remembers
very well how they watched the birds here and they saw the harbor taking
[more land]...And I also found some old letters in the archives on the
subject and... the hard-core conservationists, the old members of our
union, [were concerned because this was] a very sensitive area.20
As with the Betuwe Line, the planning for the First Maasvlakte had allowed the
environmental NGOs a consultative role of the conventional polder model variety that in
the end proved not to be enough for their interests to be incorporated into policy. There
was a historical precedent of a lack of commitment by the Ministries to respond to their
concerns in their decision making. For this reason, they were doubtful that the Ministries
could be held any more accountable in the planning process regarding the potential
construction of a Second Maasvlakte.
At the same time, the Ministries themselves were not in agreement on what they
aimed to achieve through the PMR. It was unusual for five Ministries to be involved in
such a planning process, although it had been deemed necessary due to the very broad
scope and of impacts anticipated for this project. Certain participants from VROM, for
example, who believed their responsibility was to "organize a smooth, open decision-
making process," often felt their efforts were thwarted by other Ministries who had an
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interest in a particular outcome (financial, environmental, agricultural, etc.).21 While
some Ministries felt it was necessary to keep moving the process forward, as Heuer
described it others "tried to twist your arm, a little bit more for the environment, a little
bit more for agriculture, a little bit more for farmers. So on the level of the cabinet it was
very difficult to ask them to narrow down [the alternatives being discussed]." 2 2
The nuances in the internal strife among the Ministries, were not transparent to
the NGOs. The same internal negotiations that the Ministries may have viewed as
necessary in order to determine their own role prior to engaging NGOs seemed from the
outside to be a decision-making process that they were left out of. As Alblas described it:
The formal process [that was] taking place in the Hague, in the National
Government, was a process where we were not taken seriously. And the
departments, the Ministries, were having a debate all the time it seemed to
be without the interest that is important to come to some conclusion.23
The competing Ministries, in their inability to present a unified front with respect to this
very large and complex project, could not, therefore, effectively demonstrate their
neutrality. The Ministries were in a difficult position. On the one hand, the complexity
and size of the project and implored the involvement of all five ministries, each of which
had a different stake in its outcome. On the other hand, they were unaccustomed to such a
situation and as a result could not agree among themselves how they could serve as both
neutral managers of the process while still advocating for their own interests.
In spite of these difficulties, the PMR process proceeded without major upset
during its first year. In 1998, a new Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water
Management was elected. She took two actions that in the eyes of the NGOs dramatically
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changed the structure of the negotiations. First, certain technical and scientific studies
thatwere no longer made available to them. According to Van Huut:
From the beginning...we had an open and transparent planning
process...so if we did any survey, the results of the survey would be
published at once, not at the end of the project, but once the survey was
ready we would publish it at once and discuss the results with the
stakeholders. And at one point the then new Minister of Transport said
well I don't like this, I would like to make up my mindfirst and then I will
publish these surveys, so we were no longer allowed to publish research
and survey results.24
This meant that the scientific studies that were supposed to inform the Ministries'
decisions were kept secret; the NGOs had no way to know the scientific or
technical basis of such decisions.
The second action that raised serious concerns by the NGOs was that the option of
expanding in Zeeland was suddenly discarded. The Minister declared that it had been
determined that the port areas to the southwest did not possess the geographic
characteristics required for the types of activities that would need to be located there.
While the environmental NGOs did not necessarily disagree with this assessment in
principal, they did not feel that adequate study had been conducted on this option to make
a determination. The Ministry had not come to this decision jointly with the NGOs, but
had conducted its own evaluation based on its own studies and had made the
determination that Zeeland was infeasible unilaterally. This action, in combination with
the refusal to reveal studies that served as the foundation for this and other decisions,
proved to the NGOs what they had feared all along: although the Ministries would seek
their advice, they were not committed to incorporating it into their decision-making.
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It was at this time that the new Minister of Transport, Public Works, and Water
Management also asked for a statement from the NGOs, in the form of a signed contract,
indicating their support for the decisions that had been made so far in the process,
including the elimination of Zeeland as an option. The environmental organizations
refused. Their mounting sense of insecurity regarding the process had given way to a
feeling that the Minister was going to continue to do whatever it took to push the project
through. They knew that they had the power to go to the media with the news that she
had been keeping vital information from them, which might very well turn public
sentiment against the project. And if this didn't have an impact they could take the
Minister to court for failing to fulfill her legal obligations to run an open PKB process.
They also had in their possession extremely critical letters from highly regarded
economists questioning the assumption that expansion would produce the economic
benefits that were being claimed. While they felt that the content of the letter might not
be enough to stop the project, as politics, not economics, would ultimately drive the
decision on whether or not to expand, the fact that the Minister had kept this letter a
secret could have serious political and legal repercussions. Zuid-Hollandse
Milieufederatie and Natuurmonumenten had built up a strong reputation for bringing
negotiations to this point and for using this type of information to stop projects in their
tracks, and they knew they could do the same in this case. Suddenly, the environmental
organizations felt the power balance had shifted. They were in a position to obstruct.
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D. The Ministerial Response: From PMR to ONR
Van Zwam knew that drastic actions had to be taken quickly or the entire project
risked being derailed. In spite of his loyalties to the Minister, he was certain that he had
to find a way to prevent the environmental NGOs from going to the press or taking legal
action. According to Steeklenburg, it was at this moment that Van Zwam took the "daring
step" to initiate a new process, one that would formally incorporate NGOs and provide
them with a sense of security that their interests would be listened to. This process,
Deliberation of Non-Governmental Parties (Overleg Niet-Rijspartijen, or ONR, in
Dutch), gave thirteen NGOs a more formal seat at the decision-making table. It set new
playing rules for the region, which included that the Minister could not make any
decisions before getting the advice of the ONR Board and that if she did make decisions
that went against the recommendation of the Board she would have to "give reasons"
why. 2 5
A new mediator, Hans Alders, was chosen to run this process. He was a well-
trusted individual who was known by the NGOs as well as the Ministries. Theo Klink of
DHV noted, "He has very special qualities. All people trust him...very nature-minded,
from the Ministry of [Housing, Spatial Planning and] Environment and still very accepted
by the employer's organization." As Van Huut explained it, "He was a former
Minister...so he was very acquainted with the political process, with decision-making
and he had access to the political arena in Den Haag, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of
Housing..." While the previous mediator for the PMR had been perfectly acceptable to
leaders of the NGOs, Alders had a long-standing personal relationship with them and
therefore was trusted on a deeper level. Steeklenberg stated "Frans [Evers of
25 Interview with Harry van Huut
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Natuurmonumenten] had worked under him when he had been working with the
Environmental Ministry, so he knew him closely, and I had met him a few times and had
found that we could exchange in a good way. And Alders did a great job. He did a very
important job."2 6
The Ministry selected the stakeholders who would participate carefully. Harry van
Huut said "We kept it a little bit small because a large board, the problem is they become
too large and consultations become very hard."2 7 Even within the group that existed, it
was not always easy to negotiate. On specific issues, smaller sub-groups were to be
convened by Alders. A balance had to be struck, they felt, between incorporating all of
the relevant points of view and ensuring that the group was of a manageable size.
FIGURE 1: Decision-making tables for PMR and ONR processes
ONR PMR
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The ONR process incorporated a firm commitment by the Ministries to new
playing rules, the installation of a facilitator who was respected and known personally by
many of the stakeholders, and a structural reorganization that included all of the parties
that were believed by the Ministries to represent key stakeholding interests. In
combination, the Ministries believed that these elements would create the conditions that
would allow them to rebuild trust between the NGOs and themselves and to continue to
move the process forward. The ONR would create a more inclusive process that, they
felt, would finally generate the conditions needed to formulate a consensus among the
stakeholders.
E. "Vision and Daring": The Initiative of Environmental NGOs
While the Ministries were structuring the ONR process, the environmental
organizations were grappling with two questions. First, they wondered if they would gain
more from stopping the project than they would from a negotiated agreement. In
considering this, they determined that while they had very little to lose by defecting from
the process entirely, they also had little to gain by doing so. If they could not negotiate an
agreement, they would be left with the status quo: areas of severely damaged
environment due to past port development projects, an unmet need for recreation areas
for a region without the financial capital or political support to invest in large-scale
recreation projects otherwise, and an uncertain quality of life for the many residential
areas that had fallen into decline with the changing port economy.
Over the course of the PMR process, the environmental organizations had come
to the determination that in fact participating in the negotiations might provide an
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opportunity for them to acquire a package of compensation measures that could
potentially address all of these needs. As Alblas explained it:
We said we want to defend the nature reserve that we are responsible for
and we want to create more space for nature and recreation near the city
of Rotterdam because there is a high shortage of green surroundings, the
city has no central part, so to say...And when we could get the Harbor
Authorities and the City of Rotterdam behind our ideas of nature
development in and around the city of Rotterdam we would have power
and money on our side, while we are powerless and moneyless.2 8
This redefinition was a fundamental reframing of the problem they were seeking to
address. They felt they needed to think about environmental protection and quality of life
improvements as not inherently antithetical to economic objectives. In fact, with such a
large-scale planning process there were ways in which these objectives could in fact
reinforce each other.
Having agreed among themselves that indeed they still wished to seek out a
consensus, they turned to a second question: would the new playing rules established by
the Ministry would be sufficient to ensure that their interests would now have an
influence on the outcome of the process? The Ministries claimed that the new rules for
the ONR process would create a forum where all the stakeholders could express their
core interests, where no options were removed from the table without the stakeholders'
consent, and where an open and transparent process would help to build trust between all
stakeholders. But the environmental organizations felt that the restructured ONR process
did not provide enough assurance that these conditions would be achieved. The legacy of
mistrust between the Ministries and the environmental NGOs and the environmentalists'
doubt about the Ministries commitment to responding to their interests still
overshadowed the process; the extreme polarization between the interests of the Port
28 Interview with Wilfred Alblas
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Company and the environmentalists still posed a daunting challenge; the inter-Ministerial
conflicts still raised questions with respect to the Minister of Transport, Public Works and
Water Management's capacity to facilitate the process neutrally. The ONR process
simply didn't look different enough from the PMR process to convince the environmental
NGOs that they could achieve a more desirable outcome from it.
Based on this assessment, the environmental organizations made a decision: they
would participate willingly in the ONR, but they would initiate a series of interventions,
both inside and outside of the formal planning process, in order to foster the conditions
they felt were necessary to achieve a consensus. To begin with, they felt that additional
guarantees needed to be established within the ONR process in order to ensure that it
would be more responsive to them. In spite of their frustrations, they knew they needed
the Minister's support in order for their suggestions to be accepted. Placing blame on her
for what they felt had gone wrong in the PMR process, they felt, would be
counterproductive, only serving to exacerbate the cleavage between them. As
Steeklenberg explained it, "we [the environmental NGOs] together already accepted that
we could not get out of this conversation while the Minister has got to tell, well, I was
wrong. But what we could do was get an impartial negotiator to negotiate the terms for us
to return to the process."29 They refocused their energies on ensuring that the Minister
would bring a neutral person in to take over and rather than pushing for a particular
person at the time, they made sure that they first got a commitment from her to find
someone for that role. In doing this they were able to push for Alders, someone they
knew and trusted. Perhaps even more importantly, however, they were able to rebuild
some trust with the Minister. At this moment they had the opportunity to further escalate
29 Interview with Arno Steeklenberg
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the conflict and to and exacerbate the antagonism between them. By choosing not to
attack her for her past actions but to focus on constructive actions they could take to
begin the ONR process, they could start build a new relationship with her
The other major modification to the ONR process that the environmental groups
insisted upon was that the Ministries give all parties the opportunity to critique scientific
studies conducted by the government and, where appropriate, to offer alternative
expertise. One of the measures they proposed for achieving this involved convening a
body of experts on subjects of importance to the project. The expert group would be
agreed upon by all stakeholders and could be called upon when any questions arose
regarding technical or scientific information.30 They could give an impartial judgment on
the quality of research done by the Ministries and, where they deemed it to be necessary,
provide their own studies. Beyond this, they insisted that an independent cost/benefit
analysis for the project be made by a neutral quasi-governmental agency.
The purpose of the expert group and the cost/benefit analysis was not to challenge
the studies that had already been conducted and to provide definitive evidence to counter
them. Rather, the aim was to change the role of expertise in the process. As Alblas
described it:
The point of these elements was that there was uncertainty involved,
especially ecologically in coastal ecosystems there's a lot of uncertainty
and what you do with conservation on the list it is you blow up the
uncertainties because these are arguments against something. And the
trick of Port Authorities is you hire consultants who say these are not big
risks. And then you start to struggle. And the main point is how you deal
with uncertainty...And you can address it instead of translating it into an
opinion and then struggle about opinions.31
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Rather than allowing port expansion advocates to use science to bolster their positions,
they felt that the fact that no knowledge is complete had to be acknowledged by all
stakeholders. Instead of fighting the expertise of their opposition with alternative
expertise, they sought to bring to the surface the reality that with respect to certain issues
it would not be possible to know for certain what the environmental impacts would be.
Starting from the presumption of uncertainty, they felt, they could begin to have an open
conversation about how environmental risk could be minimized. It was, in essence, an
attempt to create a way for stakeholders to come to knowledge jointly. While not as
structured as an official joint-fact finding process, it provided opportunities for
stakeholders to learn about scientific or technical matters together. This would both give
them a common starting point for certain discussions and would foster trust between
them that would likely carry over into the rest of the process.
Through both of these actions-not pushing the Minister to admit the mistake
they believed she had made and pushing for a more participatory process of scientific and
technical inquiry-the environmental organizations were able to shape the formal ONR
process. Rather than relying on the Ministries, they took the initiative to patch "holes"
they saw in the restructured negotiations. In doing so, they felt, they could alter the
relationships between stakeholders in such a way that would help to foster the necessary
conditions they needed to create in order to bring about a consensus.
But the environmental organizations did not feel that working within the ONR
process alone was going to be sufficient. Something more, something different, also had
to be done. The way the ONR process was structured each stakeholder would be given
equal opportunity to advocate for their interests to the Ministries. There were a number of
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problems with this style of consultative process, even with more of a guarantee that the
Minstries were committed to incorporating their interests and with the new playing rules
in place. First, the Ministries themselves seemed too divided in interests to be able to
respond effectively to these interests. Beyond this, two groups of stakeholders-the Port
Company and the environmental organizations-had reached an extreme state of
polarization that was difficult to address within the web of other interests represented in
the ONR and in what had become such a high-profile, high stakes setting. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the environmentalists' reframing of their own interests no
longer fit neatly within the specific interest group role they were expected to play within
the process; as they had redefined their position, they were no longer representing
"environmental protection." They now sought to find solutions to the issues raised by the
complex interplay between the environment, industry and society in the context of port
expansion.
For all of these reasons, the environmental NGOs decided to try to initiate a series
of negotiations outside of the formal process with the Municipality of Rotterdam and the
Port Company. To begin with, Frans Evers of Natuurmonumenten made a phone call to
the Mayor of Rotterdam and the City Alderman of Port and Economic Affairs. In this
conversation, he asked a question through which he aimed to inspire the Mayor to think
about reframing his own interests: "Don't you think it's strange," he asked, "that you, as a
local government, are only addressing issues of the economy and industry and we as
NGOs are only addressing issues of nature and the environment when I would think these
are concerns you also share?"3 2 The phone call was a gesture that indicated that the
environmental groups were wanted to start a new type of discussion with the City and the
32 Interview with Frans Evers
58
Port Company. They asked the Port Company if they would undertake a series of
meetings outside of the formal planning process through which they could try to talk
about their interests in the terms as Evers had reframed them-all of them working
together to devise an economically, socially, and environmentally advantageous outcome.
It was an unusual proposition. These discussions would be held entirely
independent of other stakeholders and of the Ministries. But the environmental
organizations, the Municipality, and the Port Company saw distinct advantages to this.33
To begin with, while the Environmental NGOs and the Port Company viewed themselves
as the most oppositional actors in a spectrum of viewpoints, they had found it very
difficult within the formal process to obtain a clear understanding of what their most
fundamental differences in perspectives really were; the complexity of interests
represented by all of the other stakeholders often made it difficult for them to parse out
the core issues on which they disagreed. By speaking directly, both sides could
temporarily suspend any consideration of others' interests and could focus on where their
own interests aligned or converged.
Beyond this, there was a strategic advantage to coming to an agreement among
themselves independently of the other participants in the ONR. If they were able to come
to a consensus, both parties knew that it would be very difficult for other stakeholders or
for the Ministries to object to this agreement because it would signify that the greatest
differences in interests had been resolved, which would be an enormous achievement.
Politically, this would put a great deal of pressure on the Ministries. They would then be
33 While original contact was made to the Municipality, Albert Doe from the Port Company ended up as the primary
negotiator representing Municpality and Port interests, which were presumed to be aligned. This presumption was
likely a carry-over from the PMR and ONR processes, which tended to treat the interests as one-in-the same. In
conversation, and in printed documentation from the formal processes, representation from the Port and Municipality
was often considered interchangeable in spite of the fact that during the time of negotiations the Port Company was
technically an autonomous private entity.
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placed in a position of seeming to hold up the process if they did not accept the solution
that had been created. If this unlikely alliance could be formed between the
environmental groups and the Port company, the bargaining power of both parties would
be strengthened; they would be collaborators working together to put pressure on the
Ministries, and any other dissenting stakeholders, to support the particular package of
measures they had agreed upon.
FIGURE 2: Decision-making tables for PMR, ONR and "Vision and Daring"
processes
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The environmental organizations felt that these informal negotiations had to be
managed very carefully if they were going to foster the necessary conditions for
producing a consensus. Before negotiations could take place, the first step they felt the
environmental groups needed to take was to be sure that their goals were all aligned with
each other's. According to Alblas:
Even before the talks started we were with Arno [Steeklenberg] and
Matthijs van Muijen [of Zuid-Hollandse Landschap, another NGO that
was a part of Consept]...so it was a small group of us and we discussed
what would be the core components of a deal and it then became clear
that if we could combine several aspects we would have a package which
would be in our opinion profitable for nature.34
Bolstering the strength of this already-existing alliance had two purposes. First, it gave
them a stronger bargaining position. They supported each other as discussions ensued
with the Port Company. Second, it allowed them to operate as part of a team of
individuals who brought different skills to the table-strategic thinking, networking and
lobbying, writing-and to combine them to the greater benefit of them all.35
When the talks between the environmental NGOs and the Port Company were
first initiated, the structure was left intentionally very flexible. Unlike the ONR process,
which was highly structured and geared toward a specific end-goal of creating a
document to which all parties could agree, in these informal negotiations there was no set
agenda and the end product was undefined. At the start, Alblas explained, "There was a
lot of talking and talking and talking, which is actually nothing but seeing whether people
could gain some trust."36 The environmental organizations felt that they should not come
into the negotiations with a formula for coming to an agreement. Rather, they felt it was
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crucial that they and the Port Company determine both the process and the desired end
product of the negotiations jointly. This removed a certain amount of pressure from such
a high-stakes situation and better allowed all parties to speak more freely about their
intentions and desires than they could in the ONR setting in which they felt that they had
less room to make errors.
Through these initial consultations it was agreed that they would aim to create
single document among them, a short statement that would try to first find some key
points of agreement. This document would provide them with an understanding of where
they shared interests, not considering points of contention for the time being. As
Steeklenberg described it, "In the ditches we had laid and shot our ammunition toward
each other and now we had to work together and it would be wise if there was an overall
document that was short, but concrete, to give an impression to all partners, what about
do we agree, where do we work towards together." 37
But although the participants were committed to this ideal, achieving it in practice
proved more difficult than they had anticipated. The environmentalists began by bringing
to the table a discussion paper that outlined their major goals and objectives on which
they requested comments and reactions by the Port Company. When the next meeting
was convened, however, the Port Company arrived not with modifications to this paper,
but with their own document expressing their own interests. The environmental
organizations were frustrated that they had not received feedback on their paper. At the
following meeting they responded to the paper put forth by the Port Company, but the
Port Company felt that these comments did not take into consideration what they had
written and were simply a reiteration of the points the environmentalists had put forth in
3'7 Interview with Arno Steeklenberg
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their original paper. The exchange that ensued during the first several meetings did not
seem to be making much progress with respect developing common objectives. If
anything, they risked damaging their relationship even further. Unlike in the formal ONR
process, there was no neutral party to mediate and to prevent such a situation from
escalating.
Both sides were feeling discouraged. After four or five meetings Albert Doe of
the Port Company announced that he would no longer participate. Somebody else from
the Port Company, he said, might be better suited to the negotiations. The person he
suggested, while perceived by the environmental organizations as perfectly competent
and capable of participating in the discussions, did not have the same authority at the Port
Company as Doe. Steekelenburg refused to negotiate with him. As he explained it, "I
said, well, I won't accept this. Then I won't come anymore because when I get you,
Albert, half an inch I get the whole of the Harbor Company half and inch, but when I get
[the person who would replace you] ten yards I won't get half an inch of the Harbor
Company." To Steeklenburg there was little value in holding negotiations with somebody
who did not have the authority to make the commitments they felt they needed on behalf
of the Port Company. A lower level civil servant, however attuned he or she might be to
their interests, would not guarantee that the Port Company would in the end stand behind
the agreement. With this urging, Doe agreed to continue the negotiations. But as the
papers continued to be passed back and forth, each side making comments and
modifications with each successive round unclear if they were truly coming any closer to
an agreement.
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And then Alblas made a mistake. The environmentalists had been emailing among
themselves a version of a discussion paper and had been making candid comments abut
specific parts of it. After successive rounds of edits a final version was completed and
Alblas agreed that he would email it to the Port Company. The version that he
accidentally emailed, however, included the full range of comments they had all made.
This mistake had the potential to be disastrous. The Port Company now knew that many
of the positions the environmentalists had been taking weren't nearly as firm as they had
seemed. Beyond that, their united front was revealed as not entirely solid.
But Alblas wasn't going to let this mistake ruin the progress they had made. After
consultation with Steeklenberg, he came into the next meeting with a bold proposition: to
stop any conversation about whether or not there should be a Second Maasvlakte, to
suppose that the expansion will occur and talk about what conditions would be acceptable
to all parties if it is to move forward. He asked that they start with this and then, if it
seemed that they could not all agree, they could have a conversation about whether or not
it was a good decision to expand. No longer, he promised, would they make any
arguments against the potential expansion; instead, they would seek to discuss only their
underlying interests with respect to the future of the Port and the Rotterdam region and
the ways in which an expansion might promote those interests.
This mistake, and Alblas' reaction to it, did a few things for the discussion at what
had become a critical point. First, it brought a new candor or straightforwardness into the
debate. Though much was different with respect to the characteristics of the informal
negotiations in comparison to the ONR process, many norms of behavior had carried
over. One of these norms was an opaqueness regarding the range of outcomes that parties
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would find acceptable (known as a Zone Of Possible Agreement, or ZOPA, in consensus
building literature). Alblas' challenge to this norm, albeit inadvertent, presented a new
opportunity for a different kind of discussion based on the potential to then speak more
candidly about the range of acceptable outcomes that would be acceptable to
stakeholders. It also may have reminded participants more generally that in this new
forum for negotiation they had the opportunity to challenge the conventional norms for
how they should behave in consensus building processes. While the environmental
organizations clearly had had likely been conscious of this from the outset, the mistake
was a reminder that it was indeed within their power to set new norms and rules for
negotiation.
With respect to the substantive issues of the debate, Alblas' statement after the
mistake also made the reframed position of the environmental organizations the focal
point in the discussion once again, perhaps for the first time since Evers' initial phone
call. Having redefined their objectives through the PMR process from protection of the
natural environment in the Rotterdam region in its current state to the enhanced
sustainability and improvement of the quality of life in the region, it was time, they felt,
to be very clear about their belief that opposition to the expansion was, simply, contrary
to their interests:
If we had continued debating the issue "Is Maasvlakte 2 necessary?"
which we did already for ten years we would still be talking now because
that is something you never agree on. You only can try to come to [an]
agreement when at some point in the process the problem was
redefined...[We] defined the question if the Parliament decides there
should be a Maasvlakte 2, what kind of a position should [we take] ? ,,38
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As Steeklenberg put it "If you want to have new nature, stagnation is very negative. So it
starts when you as a party, your position is that you want something instead of you don't
want something."39 They felt that "a discussion which is exclusively geared toward land
reclamation yes or no, stands in the way of a discussion on joint ambitions for qualitative
development of Rotterdam as a whole."40
Once the environmentalists' ZOPA was on the table and the discussion was
framed in terms of "yes, there can be an expansion, as long as particular conditions are
met," it took on an entirely new dynamic. The Port Company and the environmentalists
were able to see themselves as collaborators working toward the same desired outcome:
an agreement on a port expansion that would also create opportunities to enhance the
natural environment and provide the region with much-needed social and recreational
opportunities. By working together to determine what would be acceptable to them both,
they could then exert pressure on the Ministries to accept it.
Perhaps the best example of this concerned discussions over where the
southernmost edge of the new extension would be. The environmentalists wanted to see
the development moved further to the North in order to minimize negative impacts to the
coast that might occur due to change in currents that would be caused otherwise. During
the PMR process, the Port Company had maintained a position against moving the
extension farther north because this would have involved filling in deeper areas of the sea
and would have been more costly. But in the negotiations outside of the formal planning
process, with the Ministries absent, it became clear that this position had been taken
largely due to pressure by the Ministry of Finance, who was concerned about the overall
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40 "Vision and Daring," May 2000
project costs. The Port Company, itself, had little to lose or gain either way. Thus, they
were able to come to an agreement; the environmental organizations would commit to
supporting an extension of the size that was desired by the Port Company if the Port
Company would agree to reorient the extension so that it was farther north. The
additional cost that would be incurred would then be presented to the Ministry as
something that was necessary in order for both the Port Company and the environmental
groups to agree.4 ' While the Ministry might normally have challenged this proposal,
agreement among the environmental groups and the Port Company would place great
pressure on them to accept it.
Adopting this approach, it was not long before the environmentalists and the Port
Company were able to come to an agreement about what criteria needed to be met and
what compensation measures needed to be included in order for them both to support the
construction of the Second Maasvlakte. They had developed a shared text that articulated
their consensus called "Vision and Daring." This document was not legally binding; it
was simply a report to the BOM that formally stated that "the City of Rotterdam and the
nature and environment organizations.. .want to commit themselves jointly together for
an integral improvement of the Rotterdam region," including "a stronger and more
differentiated economy, more nature, and a flourishing city."42 But to the parties involved
it was viewed as a binding contract because it was founded a trustful relationship and a
strong sense of interedependence. "Vision and Daring" had accomplished what years of
formal negotiations been unable to achieve: a consensus among the Port Company and
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the major environmental organizations and a commitment from both sides that they
would stand behind this agreement.
G. "Vision and Daring" Challenged
i. Issues of Legitimacy
When the environmental organizations chose to initiate informal negotiations
directly with the Port Company, they knew they were taking a risk. The idea that the
organizations would be working toward consensus with stalwart supporters of the port's
expansion was not likely to be immediately understood by members of the organizations
or the larger environmentalist community. Many would fear that too much would have to
be compromised by the environmental organizations.
Because of this, Alblas and Steeklenburg took specific precautions in an attempt
to ensure that they would not make concessions that would be unacceptable to their
memberships. Throughout the time that the meetings were taking place, Steeklenberg
kept two of his staff members fully informed about what, specifically, he was trying to
achieve on particular issues. These staff members were responsible for identifying
potential problems and critiquing interim agreements made with the Port Company. In
this way, Steeklenburg was able to continuously check back with people who could tell
him if his concessions to the Port Company would be perceived as too great my members
of his organization.
They also "rang the bell inside the network of environmental organizations" to
alert other groups about the talks and to ask them what issues were of most important to
68
them.43 Several other environmental organizations had not made a commensurate shift in
reframing their position on the Second Maasvlakte and still stood firmly against it. For
this reason, Steeklenburg recalled, "In the broader environmental movement, the day that
this news [about the Vision and Daring agreement] was in the paper I got maybe 300 very
angry emails: What are you doing? You are selling out the environment." 44 These
organizations were not convinced that Natuurmonumenten and Zuid-Hollandse
Milieufederatie were making agreements that would best protect the environment.
Steeklenburg was anticipating this response and felt confident that if they needed
make clear to the other organizations a distinction between having endorsed the Second
Maasvlakte and having operated under the premise that if it were to more forward, what
could they gain from it by carefully negotiating a better package of environmental
compensation measures than could have been achieved if they were successful in
stopping the project. Steeklenburg explained:
Well, I personally responded to each one of them with an explanation of
how we did weigh this compromise. I also stated that nothing in the
[news]paper says that we agree with the Second Maasvlakte. I cannot
prohibit that papers write this down. If I was a journalist maybe I would
write the same thing, but it's nowhere in this paper, really not. We accept
this decision trail that is ahead. And almost nobody protested in return.
,,45Some gave positive response.
Once the broader environmental community was appeased, another challenge
remained: the group had to convince the ONR to accept the "Vision and Daring"
agreement. To a certain extent, the environmentalists had tried to keep the Ministries up
to speed throughout the negotiations. While the Ministries were aware that these
meetings were occurring, they did not fully understand their purpose or what precisely
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their intentions were. Van Huut explained that he wondered "why two stakeholders could
move out of ONR and have this document." and felt they "didn't show much of what
they were doing."4 6 And the other NGOs were not pleased by the fact that these
negotiations had been taking place. Their frustration stemmed not from the content of the
document as much as it did from the fact that the agreement had been made without their
input. They felt that an agreement that was achieved between two parties outside of the
formal process was little more than backroom dealing. In their view-steeped in the
classic polder model mentality-such deals warped the way in which interests were
negotiated in a way that could give unfair advantage to certain stakeholders.
The "Vision and Daring" document itself was virtually identical to the draft ONR
advice document, which was in its last week of review when "Vision and Daring" was
submitted to the ONR. Some simply claimed that "Vision and Daring" was redundant, a
reflection of the consensus that had been achieved in the formal ONR process. Others
sharply criticized the legitimacy of this document and the environmental organizations'
decision to hold discussions without the full consultation of the other ONR members.. As
Alblas said it, "They hated us. When we evaluated the whole process later on, the other
parties stated that they were still very angry about this deal."48
The environmental organizations knew they had to be very strategic about how
they responded to the criticism they had received. Their approach was not to engage in a
debate about the role that the talks had played, but rather to express stress the importance
of all stakeholders in supporting the ONR agreement.4 9 When it came time to present the
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results of the ONR to Parliament, Steklenberg and Evers did not try to take credit for
their work outside of the process. In doing so they aimed to alleviate what Evers referred
to as the "not invented here" syndrome, which arises when stakeholders feel compelled to
reject a certain outcome if they feel that they were not responsible for it.50 The
environmentalists had no reason not to allow the membership of the ONR and the
Ministries who organized the process to take full credit for the agreement that had been
reached; their interest was in the outcome itself, not in claiming credit for it. The
environmental organizations were in this way able to ameliorate some of the animosity of
the other NGOs. Together, and now with the support of the Port Company, they were
able to appeal directly to the Parliament with a unified voice. In spite of this, many other
stakeholders still felt that something had happened that wasn't quite right or fair, even if
they couldn't name what that "thing" was.
ii. Issues of Implementation
The Appeal of the Fishers
In June 2004, the Minister of Transport with the support of the ONR, submitted
the PKB Part 3 to the Lower House for approval. In January 2005, the Council of State,
the highest administrative course of the Netherlands, made a decision on the PKB. The
Council of State's decision stated that the search for alternatives that minimized damage
to the environment had been sufficient, the compulsory reasons for the construction of the
Second Maasvlakte were sufficiently demonstrated, and the compensation measures were
adequate in kind and amount for the damage anticipated with the port expansion. But the
Council had "destroyed" (rejected) all eight of the concrete policy decisions in the PKB.
50 Interview with Frans Evers
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This was largely due to appeals that were made by, and granted to, two parties:
Vissersbond (the National Union of Fishers) in collaboration with Productschap Vis (the
Dutch Fish Product Board) and WLTO (the Union of Farmers branch for the Western
part of the Netherlands).5 '
While Vissersbond/Productschap Vis made several appeals regarding the PKB,
only one was upheld by the Council of State. It concerned the claim that there had not
been sufficient study of the effect of the land reclamation on marine life in the
Waddenzee, to the North, which is protected by the EU's Birds and Habitats Directives.
This area is also extremely important to the flow of larvae that then grow into fish and are
caught offshore. While the location where the reclamation was to occur fell outside of the
boundaries of the protected area, the Council of State supported the claim that the study
of the potential negative impacts of the extension on the Waddenzee contained enough
uncertainty that it was not possible to be "reasonably sure" that they would not be
severe.52
Throughout the PMR processes, Productschap Vis felt completely alienated.
When the process began, they felt many of the same frustrations as the NGOs who were
not convinced that their consultative role would have real, direct impacts on the
Ministries' decision-making process. It had been argued by the Ministries that fishing
could be represented adequately by the Employer's Organization, but to Productschap
Vis, the entire industry could not be represented by this organization. Many of the
employers' represented by it had a very strong pro-port position and would therefore not
;' The decision also found certain procedural problems with the PKB process, including that a PKB needs a specific
duration time, which was not specified and that a planned sea reserve that was one of the compensation measures
needed to be in place before they can start building the Second Maasvlakte.
52 Interview with Jozja Bechinka
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necessarily push for the same for conditions for development that the fishing industry
desired. Beyond this, the entire supply chain for the fishing industry and the many people
whose livelihood depended on it included interests that fell outside of those generally
covered by the Employers Organization.
Once the ONR process was initiated, they were still not invited to the table. In
part, this was due to the fact that Productschap Vis was a statutory organization and not
an NGO. This meant that they could make their comments known, but they were not
invited to regular meetings. At the same time, they were not given the same rights they
felt they would have had if they had been a government body. Under the PKB legislation,
governmental organizations are entitled to special consultation in a project of national
significance, which normally takes the form of a public hearing. But upon making a
request for a hearing, Productschap Vis received no reply from the Ministry. Denied any
access to top-level negotiations, the only channel through which they could express their
objections was to write letters as is allowed of any individual or group from the public.
Letters were written and the major concerns that were expressed regarding the marine
reserve and the Waddenzee were again, according to Productschap Vis, not addressed.
Traditionally in such cases the fishing industry and the environmentalists would
ally themselves against the project. They would frame the conflict as one in which
development stood in direct conflict with the protection of vulnerable coastal ecosystems
and they would position themselves in support of the protection of these environments.
But this time, the fishing industry felt they had no support from the environmental
organizations. Nathalie Steins, who made the appeal for Productschap Vis, iterated:
We could not understand that the environmental groups, who normally
also are very much focused on sustainable fisheries management in the
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North Sea, that they just basically didn't do anything and would allow it.
Also because they were always the ones who always say, well the
precautionary principle, in case you don't know for certain you shouldn't
do it.53
By formulating a consensus with the Port Company independently the
environmental organizations broke from their usual alliances. While Productschap
Vis recognized that the environmental NGOs had acquired a large package of
compensation measures, these measures were not aligned with the interests of the
fishing industry. In fact, they felt one in particular-the designation of a protected
marine reserve where no fishing would be allowed-was entirely contradictory to
their interests.
Feeling that they had been blatantly neglected in the formal planning process and
abandoned by the environmental organizations, Productschap Vis felt they had no choice
but to appeal. The fact that they were not an independent organization, but rather a
statutory agency, complicated this matter as was unclear to them at the start whether as
part of the government an appeal would be legally permissible. For this reason, they
initially operated through Vissersbond, financing and organizing their activities and
making the appeal under the name of "Vissersbond and others." Only later did the
Council of State rule that Productschap Vis could legally appeal, and their name was
added.
This was the first time Productschap Vis had gone to court, and they did so only
because they felt as if they had no other choice. Had they been included in the Ministies'
process, they insisted that they would not have had to make the appeal. Steins explained:
A lot of people think that the fishing industry is opposed to the whole idea
of expanding the harbor and reclaiming the land and that is not the case
53 Interview with Nathalie Steins
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because the harbor, and everybody who works in the harbor, they are
entrepreneurs, and the fishing industry is also entrepreneurs so we know
that this is very important to the Dutch economy so there is no way that we
want to stop the whole project. But what we felt was that the interests of
the fishing industry from the start had not been taken seriously and that
was the whole reason and not only from the beginning but also from the
rest of the process we felt that that was really bad...And I'm sure that
when everybody else signed a deal if there had been a plan for us for how
to compensate the industry, those people who lost their fishing
opportunities, not only in the land reclamation area but also in the marine
reserve, and if there would have been a discussion on what are your
objectives for the marine reserve and which fisheries fit in those
objectives, maybe with some extra management rules, and which ones
don't, if that discussion would have been there, I think we probably would
have signed the deal as well.54
While they had not interpreted their interests as inherently antithetical to the construction
of the Second Maasvlakte at the beginning, the failure of the Ministries to fully assess the
potential impacts of the project on their industry had left them with no other option.
A role shift had taken place. The groups representing fishing interests had taken
the type of action that conventionally would have been pursued by environmental
organizations. Beyond the fact that they took unprecedented action to appeal, the
argument that they used and was upheld in court that scientific evidence was insufficient
to demonstrate that minimal damage would be inflicted and was the type of argument
normally used by environmentalists. In this case, the environmental organizations had
dealt with what they perceived to be the inherent uncertainty of certain scientific studies
by making the argument that the decision on whether or not to build the Second
Maasvlakte was, ultimately, not going to be founded in scientific reasoning, but would be
political. Given this understanding, they aimed to broaden the scope of issues on the table
in order to minimize to the greatest extent possible negative environmental impacts and
to maximize compensation for an overall package of measures where they felt they
54 Interview with Nathalie Steins
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would achieve net gain. The fishing industry had a similar understanding of the politics
of the situation, but the scientific uncertainty fell within their more narrow scope of
interests. While the environmental organizations might have been willing to accept a
disturbance in the environment in a particular area as long as it was compensated
elsewhere, as the fishing industry had defined their interests as tied specifically to the
area that threatened to be disturbed, they did not have that flexibility. Like the
environmental organizations had done many times in the past, the fishing industry now
maintained that as long as there was uncertainty in the environmental impact, the project
must not move forward.
The Appeal of the Farmers
The second major appeal that was upheld by the Council of State, was made by
WLTO, representing farmers in the region. The appeal was made on the grounds that
there had not been enough consideration of their interests when the decision was made to
designate 750 hectares in the Rotterdam region as new nature/recreation space as part of
the package of compensation measures committed to in the PKB. Of the 750 hectares,
600 hectares would be located in IJsslemonde, just below the southernmost boundary of
the Municipality of Rotterdam. This location had been identified by the Province of
South Holland as an ideal place to address the need for more nature and recreational
space in the region. The farmers' organization, however, insisted that the plan for the 600
hectares, which called for part it to remain in the possession of farmers and part to be
used for recreational purposes, would change the character of the land in such a way that
would make it unsuitable for farming. Beyond this, they maintained that the lack of
specification in the PKB regarding how and when the government would purchase
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farmland for conversion a made for an extremely uncertain future for them; this
uncertainty in itself would seriously damage their quality of life.
The farmers had faced similar challenges to participation in the formal planning
process as the fishing industry; they found it extremely difficult to acquire direct access
to top-level negotiations during the PMR process and they were not invited to the table
during the ONR negotiations. Claims had been made by the Ministries that the interests
of the farmers could be represented by the Municipality of Albrandswaard, under whose
jurisdiction the land that was to be converted fell. But the farmer's organization did not
agree with this. They felt very strongly that their interests did not necessarily align with
those of the Municipality, as the majority of residents in this town were not farmers.
What the Municipality of Albrandswaard characterized as efforts to reach out to the
farmers to determine how they could best represent their interests, the farmer's
organization looked upon resentfully as attempts to persuade them hand over their fate to
them.
For these reasons, when the PKB was submitted calling for a plan for a new
nature and recreation area in IUsslemonde, which would allow some to stay and did not
specify precisely what the compensation would be for those who would be displaced, the
farmers felt they could not accept it. They made their successful appeal on the grounds
that their economic future was not sufficiently accounted for. The farmers knew exactly
what they wanted. Although development was not anticipated for several years they were
insistent that the government should buy all of their land at once. Some farmers who
would be interested staying on their land might have the option to do so until the
recreation area was be built, but they would at the very least know for certain that the
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government would pay them all an agreed upon sum upfront for their land. Furthermore,
the timing of their relocation would not occur at the whim of the government and none
would be "left behind" with the difficult task of farming lands as they were encroached
upon by recreation.
Like the fishers, the farmers believed that the process could have been constructed
in such a way that would have led to an outcome they could have supported. There is
nothing inherent in the Second Maasvlakte project or the conception that there should be
environmental compensation measures for it that they felt was inherently contradictory to
their interests. Unlike the fishers, the farmers did not expect the environmental
organizations to be their allies, but they did believe that had the environmental NGOs
acted differently they might have been able to help each other promote their interests.
Leonie Claessen, who conducted a large part of the negotiations on behalf of WLTO,
insisted that the farmers and the environmentalists normally have "different goals, but
similar strategies."55 It is her belief that the farmers and the environmentalists, although
they are often at odds with respect to their substantive objectives, have similar needs with
respect to how formal planning processes need to be structured in order for them to have
some influence on its outcome. Historically, according to Claessen, the farmers and the
environmental groups have sometimes been able to work together to ensure that these
conditions are met.
In this case, however, the environmental groups did not actively pursue that
objective with the vigor they may have employed in the mast. By acting outside of the
formal planning process, they did not have to fight as hard for certain conditions within
it. Rather, they were able to formulate a new dynamic between themselves and the Port
'5 Interview with Leonie Claessen
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Company that in effect reduced their need to demand as much from the formal process.
As with the fishers, the farmers felt they were thus left to fight this battle largely on their
own. Finding they were unable to win it, they saw an appeal as their only viable course of
action.
The Appeals Considered
The success of both the farmers' and the fishers' appeals raises an important
question regarding the decision that was made by the environmental NGOs to take the
initiative to alter the environment of the negotiations. Did their actions make it more
difficult to implement the consensus that was achieved? In the aftermath of the Council
of State's decision, which was a surprise to many who felt that they would be strongly
influenced by political pressure to push the project through, the media largely portrayed
the failure as that of the Ministries. Given the Ministries' formal responsibility for the
process, and the environmentalists' efforts to avoid the "not invented here" problem, it is
not surprising that the Ministries would be blamed.
The actions of the environmental organizations removed the consensus
formulation from the institutional and political structures that normally ensure that the
agreement is also one that can be implemented. Steeklenburg and the environmentalists
do not necessarily see the appeals as detrimental threatening to ultimate realization of the
plan in the long run; in fact, he argues, the appeals, if they can subsequently be
adequately addressed, will only make the end outcome more solidly reflective of a broad
spectrum of interests. As Steeklenberg noted, "we have never suggested that our process
should prohibit successful appeals; we think that the possibility to appeal is an integral
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part of any serious process."56 Nevertheless, at the time this thesis was completed it was
anticipated that the process will extend for at least another year, while studies are
conducted on the impacts of the project on the Waddenzee and negotiations with the
fishers and farmers continue. This is not the most desirable outcome for either the Port
Company or the environmental NGOs, both of whom would prefer to see the project and
its compensation measures implemented sooner rather than later.
But at the same time the decision to uphold the appeals cannot be constituted as a
complete failure on behalf of the NGOs. Representatives of the stakeholder groups that
appealed indicated that they did not come out of the process feeling that their interests
were inherently irreconcilable with the project. Rather, they simply felt that they were not
provided sufficient opportunity to influence the process, and they could not rely on their
traditional allies to support them. This means that the environmental organizations could
likely have taken steps that would have integrated their concerns into the Vision and
Daring negotiations.
The success of the appeals are line with what has been suggested by Potapachuk
and Crocker regarding institutional incapability in the age of governance: policy often
does not exist for implementing the types of consensuses formed through interaction
among broad networks of stakeholders. Popular sentiment was that the Ministries were to
blame. This was in essence the flip-side of their taking the credit for he consensus that
was achieved and the environmental NGOs protecting against the "not invented here"
problem. But difficulty in implementation in this case could also be interpreted as a
mandate for the environmental organizations to broaden their role even further to prevent
such groups from being left out. Viewed in this light, the environmental NGOs, in
56 Email to author by Arno Steeklenburg, 22 February 2005
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transforming their roles, didn't go far enough. In order to address the implementation
"gap," they would have take a more active role in insuring that certain interests, that may
be less accommodated due in part to their operations outside of the decision-making
process, are addressed in some other way. This may involve pushing the Ministries to
include the full spectrum of stakeholders or putting themselves in the position of central
broker between these organizations and the government. In this case, however, this was
not achieved. Their relationship to other actors and their creation of new norms of
interaction was only partial; an ideally functioning new institution had not been created to
entirely fill the "voids" of the old one. The environmental NGOs were operating in an
unknown sphere where they were still seeking to re-make their roles not knowing for
certain what the end outcome would be.
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V. CONCLUSION
In the twenty-first century, the world's largest ports must possess very specific
physical characteristics in order to remain globally competitive-ports need more land
area, deeper berths, and more direct and efficient connections to landside transportation
infrastructure than ever before. In order to meet these demands, ports are moving closer
to the sea and farther away from existing communities and their historic geographies, in
many cases dramatically transforming the physical environment to accommodate their
needs. At the same time, in seeking to improve the efficiency with which goods are
transferred through ports, the authorities that oversee them are rapidly adopting more
advanced technology and streamlining logistics networks. This has resulted in a
significant decrease in demand for labor and large-scale, local job losses. All of these
factors combined have contributed to a port planning around the world that is
increasingly characterized by disconnectedness with the local context, a prioritization of
moving the process forward over facilitation of a diverse range of stakeholder
participation, and a "top-down" orientation where the scope of options for redevelopment
or expansion is predetermined by experts who are perceived to possess the technical
knowledge needed to make it work. As a result, in case after case-from Long Beach to
Shanghai-protests have arisen by local communities and environmentalists, leading to
drawn-out legal battles, intractable disputes and, ultimately, outcomes in which one party
achieves its desired goal and the other suffers tremendous losses.
One approach to resolving this dilemma would be for the entity responsible for
port planning-most often a governmental or quasi-governmental agency-to take the
initiative to restructure their planning process to try to avoid such conflict. This was what
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the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management attempted with the
creation of the ONR process. A pure application of standard "best practice" consensus
building might call upon the government to initiate a new process that would create the
conditions through which stakeholders could begin to think more in terms of interests
rather than positions, build trust between each other, and come to feel a sense of
interdependence and a shared vision for the future. The case study presented in this
thesis, however, suggests that perhaps the traditional institutions through which this
process would usually be carried out are no longer capable of to addressing the problems
of port planning in the contemporary world. The nature of the problem has changed in
such a way that requires something more than the application of certain guidelines within
the existing institutional context.
When the planning process for the Second Maasvlakte reached a state of crisis,
the Ministries responded in a way that in many ways aligned with the fundamental
principles of mutual gains-oriented consensus building. They initiated a new process that
in which the Ministries committed to certain "playing rules" that were clearly articulated;
they gave the nongovernmental stakeholders the opportunity to review all documentation
of significance; and they brought in a neutral facilitator to run the process that all
stakeholders respected and trusted. But even in taking these measures, certain issues had
not been resolved for the environmental organizations. They still did not feel entirely
trustful of the Minister's commitment to incorporating their interests into policy; the
multiplicity of stakeholders created a complex web of interests that made it hard to focus
on the most dramatic schisms between themselves and the Port Company; the sense of
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formality and "publicness" of the ONR made it difficult for them (and the Port Company)
to reframe their interests in the way they needed in order to have a productive doalogue.
What the environmental organizations attempted to do was to seek out ways to fill
the "voids" in the existing institutional framework themselves. Some of this they
accomplished by placing new demands on the formal structure of negotiations, for
example in insisting on an impartial body of experts that could be called upon to give
advice. Largely, however, they felt they had to work outside of this process to alter their
relationship to both their most oppositional actor and to the Ministries and pursue their
reframed interets. This decision, made possible also by the willingness of the Port
Company to do the same, created a new ad hoc, informal institution that established
another set of implicit playing rules for the marco-level negotiation. Within the new
institution, some of the strategies the environmental NGOs employed for reaching
consensus seemed to mimic what had been tried in the ONR process. These included the
building up of a common text or and the emphasis on the need for commitment by all
parties-seemingly standard consensus-building techniques. Other aspects of the "Vision
and Daring" process, however, took on a new look and feel--the setting was more
informal, there was no pre-established end-goal, there was an openness regarding each
others' ZOPAs. Through this combination of tactics the environmental NGOs and the
Port Company were able to reframe the problem they were dealing with, and their
relationship to it, in a way they had been unable to achieve in within the ONR process.
The issues that arose regarding the legitimacy and implementation of the consensus that
was ultimately achieved demonstrated that the environmental organizations were not able
to fully transform their relationship to the problem to achieve the most desirable
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immediate outcome. In spite of this, their actions can be interpreted as a significant step
in a longer-term process of creating something new, something with the potential to
"work better," than the old way.
As a multi-perspective, descriptive account , this case is extremely informative for
stakeholders trying to influence or manage similar networks. Framing the characteristics
of modem port planning with respect institutional incapacity, the case demonstrates that
stakeholders can indeed create the conditions for new forms of deliberation that can lead
to mutually beneficial policy outcomes. From the perspective of a stakeholder seeking
change, this case study provides evidence that in such situations they do not have to
choose between working within the existing structure and defecting and protesting. They
have a third option. By stepping outside of conventional roles and by challenging existing
institutions-not directly through protest, but by realigning the relationships between
actors-they have the potential to change the negotiation environment in ways that will
bring about outcomes they otherwise could not have achieved.
These insights are equally important to governmental entities that are responsible
for managing planning processes for major port development projects. The case study
presented is not intended to be a criticism of the Dutch Ministries involved in the Second
Maasvlakte negotiation or of government-organized negotiations more generally, nor is it
meant to advocate for a completely decentralized type of planning that is entirely
stakeholder-driven. But the case study calls attention to the limitations of government in
these processes that might not be recognizable to practitioners embedded in them. These
limitations do not absolve them of responsibility, but should cause them to reconsider
how they might structure processes that encourage deliberation among a wider spectrum
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of stakeholders to their advantage. Experimentation with ideas such as encouraging
certain stakeholders to engage in parallel processes while keeping those involved in the
formal process abreast of their discussions or allowing stakeholders to determine jointly
who should be at the decision-making table and what roles they should play, may provide
opportunities for governments to allow for more deliberative processes, while still
maintaining some control over them with respect to aspects they need to manage (such
keeping them on schedule and keeping costs down). These "mixed" process might
provide authorities the opportunity to preempt stakeholders' potentially destructive
behavior with respect to their process and to encourage a more constructive relationship.
From this perspective, the potential more central roles of stakeholders in planning
processes are not inherently undermining to their authority, but are necessary if they are
to unprecedented challenges they face in the modern era.
Certain aspects of this case are unique to the Netherlands-the central role of
Ministries in national planning projects, the specific ways in which the notion of
environmentalism has evolved within the country, and, of course, the deep tradition of a
very particular type of consensus-based policy-making through the polder model. For
this reason, it may be easier to directly apply some of the lessons learned from this case
in the Netherlands-for example the need to address the unique position of statutory
entities like Productschap Vis who have an unclear role in polder model-based
negotiations because they "fit" neither as NGOs not as government bodies. But many
other lessons-from the importance of recognizing the role that informal processes can
play in influencing the formal to the need to question the presumption that establishing
new playing rules for a negotiation will negate long-standing feelings of mistrust-are
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broadly applicable to a wide range of contexts. In fact, it is in foreign contexts that the
case may be most valuable as an instructive example.
Finally, beyond its implications for practice, the case study presented in this thesis
makes a noteworthy contribution to the way in which scholars can think about consensus
building in the emerging network society. At first consideration, the dominant theories of
mutual gains-based negotiations-which tend to be prescriptive in nature and aim to
provide strategies that call for highly structured consensus-building processes-and the
approaches taken in understanding deliberative democracy and the rise of governance-
which tend to be non-evaluative and emphasize the need for a multiplicity of complex,
formal and informal interactions between actors in generating policy-are not easily
reconcilable. This case study, however, presents an opportunity to consider the way in
which some of the most the elementary principles of consensus building are both
challenged by and hold up against the shift from government-based to governance-based
policy formulation.
Various interpretations of whether or not the environmental NGOs in this case
were successful in their negotiaitons, as measured either by the outcome of this process
or by the long-term impact of their actions on the relationships between actors, can be
drawn from this case. The fact that no national environmental organization appealed the
decision on such a large, high-stakes project represents a consensus that was able to
overcome not only vast cleavages between environmentalists and port expansion
advocates, but also a multiplicity of sub-interests among environmental organizations. It
is even possible to frame the legitimacy and implementation challenges that arose out of
the unconventional actions of the environmental organizations in terms of difficulties that
87
could have been avoided with the conscientious application of certain "checks"
throughout the process. The actions of the environmental organizations do not represent a
perfect solution to the voids in the existing institutions that they felt prevented a
consensus form being achieved. But even if they did not find the complete "right"
alternative, the generation of more alternatives that could potentially fill the "void" as it
exists must be lauded as a success in and of itself.
On the one hand, it seems likely that the actions of the environmental
organizations in this case established precedents for future processes, new norms for
interaction that will remain in place so as to help facilitate the generation of similar
consensuses in the future. On the other hand, not long after "Vision and Daring" was
completed, negotiators in the process have already indicated that the "energy" and
"commitment" among parties has waned. The appealing parties, similarly, are not
convinced that any sort of learning process has been internalized by the environmental
organizations or the Ministries that would cause them to better incorporate their interests
if a similar planning process were to be initiated in the future. At the time that this thesis
was completed, the case seemed to rest firmly in the realm of Hajer and Zonneveld's
"shadow structure;" while real transformations in the existing institutions are evident, it
has yet to be seen whether or not these changes signify a lasting new paradigm for
decision-making. The extent to which the shift will endure will depend on the ability of
participants in it-whether they are government agencies, non-governmental
organizations, or private citizens-to identify the ways in which their roles and
relationships in micro-level negotiation processes have changed. Only with this
knowledge will they have the guidance they need to create new institutional arrangements
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that will take advantage of the opportunities for the creation of more effective and
equitable policy through governance.
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